SANTOS RODRIGUEZ, III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Santos Rodriguez was charged with cocaine possession after a deputy seized contraband during a patdown search following a traffic stop. The court reversed the denial of his motion to suppress, holding that the deputy lacked the requisite probable cause to believe Rodriguez was carrying drugs, even assuming the initial stop and patdown were lawful.
The court reversed the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress because the evidence did not establish that the deputy had probable cause to believe Rodriguez was carrying drugs. The deputy's uncertainty about what he felt, combined with his lack of experience in drug interdiction, did not meet the standard required under the plain feel doctrine.
[1] A police officer may seize contraband discovered during a lawful patdown for weapons if the totality of the circumstances gives the officer probable cause to believe the…
[2] The State bears the burden of proving that an officer had probable cause to seize contraband felt during a lawful patdown.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If, during a lawful patdown for weapons, the totality of the circumstances gives a police officer probable cause to believe the detainee is carrying drugs, the officer may seize them.”
Establishes the legal standard for seizing contraband during a patdown search
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA Collier County deputy conducted a patdown search of Rodriguez during a traffic stop and felt objects in his pocket that the deputy believed might be…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Santos Rodriguez was charged with possessing cocaine1 that a Collier County deputy discovered in his pocket during a traffic stop. He moved to suppress the contraband, but the circuit court denied his motion. He thereafter pleaded no contest, reserving the right to appeal this disposi-tive issue. Even if we assume that the deputy had a valid reason to stop the car in which Rodriguez was traveling and had sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a patdown for weapons under Terry,
we must reverse. The evidence at the suppression hearing did not establish the deputy had probable cause to believe that Rodriguez was carrying contraband.
If, during a lawful patdown for weapons, the totality of the circumstances gives a police officer probable cause to believe the detainee is carrying drugs, the officer may seize them. Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442 (Fla.1992); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (establishing the “plain feel doctrine,” under which a police officer may seize contraband felt during a lawful patdown if its illicit nature is immediately identifiable). The State has the burden of proving that the officer had the requisite probable cause. It must present more evidence than just the officer’s statement he had a “feeling” based on “experience” that the object he felt was contraband. Doctor, 596 So. 2d at 445.
In this case, the deputy’s testimony did not establish that he immediately knew the objects in Rodriguez’s pocket were drugs. He stated “I thought — I wasn’t too sure that it could have been drugs down in small packets, you know, little baggies.... I just patted several times to see what I was feeling and that’s where I came to the conclusion that it was small packets, baggies .... ” He later admitted he was not sure that what he felt was drugs. See Cole v. State, 727 So. 2d 280, 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing denial of motion to suppress based on “plain feel doctrine” when officer did not testify that it was immediately apparent to him that the objects he felt were drugs).
Moreover, the deputy did not have extensive experience with drug crimes. As the Doctor court noted, an officer’s experience and training are relevant because they can provide specific facts from which the officer could reasonably deduce that a crime was being committed. 596 So. 2d at 445. In that case, the police officer had made some 250 arrests for possession of controlled substances, had been present during approximately 1000 drug arrests, and had felt or seen rock cocaine about 800 times. Id.; see also State v. J.D., 796 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (explaining that officer had six years of training in drug identification, had frequently encountered marijuana violations, and had made over 100 marijuana arrests). The deputy in this case testified he had made only “several” arrests for cocaine and had been present during “several” others. He did not testify about any training he had received in drug identification. Also, the deputy never testified that he knew what cocaine felt like; he merely stated he had seen crack and powdered cocaine.
The totality of these circumstances, the deputy’s lack of experience in drug interdiction combined with his uncertainty about what he felt in Rodriguez’s pocket, did not give him the probable cause necessary to lawfully seize the contraband. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion to suppress evidence and remand with directions to discharge him.
DAVIS, J., and DANAHY, PAUL W„ Senior Judge, Concur. . § 893.13, Fla. Stat. (1999).
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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E.B. v. State, 866 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…of crack cocaine, types of concealment, and methods of packaging). Further, it is the State’s burden to prove a police officer possessed the requisite probable cause. A mere “feeling” based on prior experience is not sufficient. Rodriguez v. State, 807 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). And although the officer had often found cocaine in similar tubes in the past, many other legal items are carried in such containers. Probable cause does not exist when the circumstances are equally consistent with noncrimin…
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Santiago v. State, 84 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…e items were property. Notably, the officer did not even testify that he believed the items were contraband, only that he knew the items were property. Regardless, this feeling was insufficient to legitimize the seizure. See id.; Rodriguez v. State, 807 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“The State has the burden of proving that the officer had the requisite probable cause. It must present more evidence than just the officer’s statement he had a ‘feeling’ based on ‘experience’ that the object he [*460] felt…
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State v. Wallie M. Witherspoon, 924 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…(Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“[I]n the absence of additional circumstances which would justify a more complete search, consent to a mere patdown does not include consent to reach into the pockets of a suspect and retrieve the contents.”); Rodriguez v. State, 807 So. 2d 130, 131-32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (discussing how to justify seizure under the plain-feel doctrine, an officer’s testimony must establish that he immediately knew the objects in the defendant’s pocket were drugs). However, the officer did not reach into Wi…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (U.S. 1993)
- Terrtric Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1992)
- D.S. v. State, 727 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- State v. J.D., 796 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)