STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY ORICK, APPELLEE
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The court held that the blood samples were legally seized under section 943.325, Florida Statutes, because the defendant met the statutory criteria for collection.
[1] A person previously convicted of a qualifying offense and subject to registration requirements under section 775.13, Florida Statutes, is subject to blood sample collecti…
[2] A sexual battery conviction qualifies as an offense specified in section 943.325(1), Florida Statutes, for the purpose of mandatory blood sample collection.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe state appealed an order suppressing blood samples taken from the defendant during his incarceration for a concealed firearm conviction. The defend…
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WOLF, J.
The state appeals from an order of the trial court suppressing blood samples taken from the defendant and all information resulting from the testing of these samples. The trial court’s ruling was based on a determination that the blood was illegally seized because appellant did not meet the criteria enumerated in section 943.325, Florida Statutes. The state asserts that the court’s ruling on that basis constituted error. We agree. It is undisputed that appellee had a sexual battery conviction in October of 1987. On January 27, 1999, he was convicted of one count of carrying a concealed firearm and was sentenced to five years in prison. The disputed blood sample was taken from the appellee during his incarceration for that crime. Section 943.325(10)(c) provides that
[a]ny person previously convicted of an offense specified in this section, or a crime which, if committed in this state, would be an offense specified in this section, and who is also subject to the registration requirement imposed by s. 775.13, shall be subject to the collection requirement of this section when the appropriate agency described in this section verifies the identification information of the person. The collection requirement of this section does not apply to a person as described in s. 775.13(6).
(Emphasis supplied.) Appellee’s sexual battery conviction is one of the crimes specified in section 943.325(1), Florida Statutes. Appellee, having been convicted of a felony, is a person subject to the registration requirements of section 775.13, Florida Statutes. It is undisputed that none of the exemptions contained in section 775.13, Florida Statutes, apply to the appellee.
The trial court erred in determining that the blood taken from the defendant was not taken in accordance with section 943.325, Florida Statutes. It is, therefore, unnecessary to reach the other issues raised by the state. The order granting suppression of evidence is reversed.
WEBSTER and BROWNING, JJ., concur.