LINDA RICE CHAPMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
MORTON LAITNER, APPELLEE
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Linda Rice Chapman appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Morton Laitner and from an award of attorney's fees to Laitner. The court affirmed the summary judgment but reversed the attorney's fees award under state law, finding it preempted by federal law, and remanded for determination of fees under the federal standard.
The court affirmed the summary judgment because review of the evidence in the light most favorable to Chapman showed insufficient admissible evidence to create a jury question on whether Laitner violated the federal civil rights statute. The court reversed the attorney's fees award under Florida law because it was preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows attorney's fees to prevailing defendants only in limited circumstances.
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate when there is insufficient admissible evidence to create a jury question regarding a civil rights violation.
[2] A Florida statute allowing attorney's fees based on an offer of judgment is preempted by federal law when the federal law provides for attorney's fees in a more limited c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A review of the evidence, in the light most favorable to Chapman, indicates that there was insufficient admissible evidence to create a jury question as to whether Laitner committed any conduct that violated section 1988.”
Establishes the basis for affirming the summary judgment—lack of evidence to support Chapman's federal civil rights claim
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChapman filed a civil rights suit against Laitner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following extensive discovery, the trial court granted Laitner's motion for …
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GODERICH, Judge.
Linda Rice Chapman filed suit against Morton Laitner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a civil rights violation. Following extensive discovery, the trial court granted Laitner’s motion for final summary judgment. Thereafter, the trial court granted Laitner’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2000), and Rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, based on Lait-ner’s offer of judgment. Chapman’s appeal followed. A review of the evidence, in the light most favorable to Chapman, indicates that there was insufficient admissible evidence to create a jury question as to whether Laitner committed any conduct that violated section 1988. As such, we affirm the trial court’s order granting final summary judgment in favor of Laitner. See Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F. 3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 808, 117 S.Ct. 51, 136 L.Ed.2d 15 (1996).
Chapman also appeals from the award of attorney’s fees. We reverse based on the factually indistinguishable case of Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In Moran, the Second District held that section 768.79(1) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “because section 1988 allows the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in a much more limited context than does section 768.79(1).” Moran, 694 So. 2d at 887.
Laitner also sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial court, however, did not rule on that issue finding that it was moot as a result of its award pursuant to section 768.79. Therefore, although a review of the record does not seem to indicate that Laitner was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, we remand to the trial court for such a determination. See Moran, 694 So. 2d at 886-87 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983))(“A prevailing defendant [in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,] may recover an attorney’s fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.”).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
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Marcy v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 921 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…sion authorizing a defendant to obtain attorney’s fees, and that provision has been interpreted to allow defendant’s recovery only when the claims of the plaintiff are vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass the defendant. See Chapman v. Laitner, 809 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Likewise, the Federal Fair Debt Protection Collection Act has an express provision that denies defendant’s a fee recovery unless the plaintiffs claims are in bad faith or to harass the defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). While no…
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Jones v. United Space Alliance, L.L.C., 494 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)…recover attorneys’ fees only when the underlying claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”) (citing Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal followed Moran in Chapman v. Laitner, 809 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002)). Importantly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, in a case applying § 768.79 to a suit brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, distinguished Moran by noting that the offer-of-judgment provision a…
Authorities Cited
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983)
- Johnson v. Wayland Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir. 1996)
- Moran v. City OF Lakeland, 694 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 519 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1996)