FRANK EDGE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Frank Edge was convicted of breaking and entering a courthouse with intent to steal a gun. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that Edge's voluntary reporting of the gun to authorities and immediate production of it negated any intent to steal, making the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdict.
The conviction is reversed because the evidence is insufficient to sustain it. Edge's prompt voluntary reporting of the incident and immediate production of the gun are inconsistent with an intent to steal, negating the essential element of larcenous intent required for the crime.
“The possession by a person of property which has been recently stolen from a building may be sufficient if unexplained to warrant a conviction of such person of the crime of entering the building with intent to steal.”
Establishes the rule that unexplained possession of stolen property can support a conviction, setting up the distinction the court makes in this case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA courthouse was broken into on the night of September 26, 1927, and an old gun was taken. Edge was on the courthouse grounds that night voluntarily k…
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Ennis, C. J.
Frank Edge was convicted of breaking and entering the Walton County Court House with intent to steal the property of another of the value of less than fifty dollars.
The court house was broken into on the night of September 26, 1927, and an old gun taken away. The next morning the accused reported the matter to the janitor and said that during the night some one appeared on the court house grounds and when he hailed him and ordered him to stop the person dropped the gun and Edge recovered it and later carried it to his house. Not knowing what to do with it or where it came from except that it had been in the possession of one who acted suspiciously when Edge called to him, he reported the matter to the janitor. It is not clear why Edge was on the court house grounds that night except that he had voluntarily offered to keep the fresh cement in a newly erected monument on the grounds wet during the night. It is advisable or customary to keep new cement work wet until the cement ‘ ‘ sets. ’ ’
The possession by a person of property which has been recently stolen from a building may be sufficient if unexplained to warrant a conviction of such person of the crime of entering the building with intent to steal. See Tilly v. The State, 21 Fla. 242.
There is however no presumption of law flowing from the unexplained possession of goods recently stolen that the possessor stole them. It is only when such possession is unexplained that guilt may be inferred as a matter of fact by considering such unexplained possession in connection with all the other circumstances of the case. See Rimes v. State, 36 Fla. 90, 18 So. R. 180; Kilcrease v. State, 96 Fla., 264; 117 So. R. 862.
An important circumstance to be considered in this case is the prompt reporting of the incident which the accused said occured on the court house grounds that night and the voluntary production by him of the gun which he said he recovered and which was alleged to have been stolen. Such circumstance is certainly not consistent with a desire to appropriate the property, claim it as his own or conceal it. If the larceny was the purpose of entering the house the voluntary reporting of the supposed incident in which the accused recovered the gun and immediate production of it by him negatives the idea of any purpose to steal it. If there was no purpose to steal the gun there was a failure to prove the intention with which the house was entered.
The accused was not found in possession of the property in the sense that he had it secreted and some one else discovered it. He voluntarily reported it to the authorities.
His account of how he acquired it may not have been believed by the jury and the account may have been neither reasonable nor plausible but the fact inconsistent with the idea of' larceny remains, viz: that he voluntarily produced the property and disclaimed any title or interest in it.
The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict, so the judgment is reversed.
Strum and Brown, J. J., concur. Whitfield, P. J. and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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Aronovitz v. Stein Props., 322 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…ot, as such without statutory authority, sue in its firm name. All actions by a partnership must be brought in the names of its individual members. Johnston v. Albritton, 1931, 101 Fla. 1290, 134 So. 563; I. Epstein & Bros. v. First Nat. Bank, 1926, 96 Fla. 796, 110 So. 354; and 24 ;Jur., Partnership, § 191. Even though our Legislature in 1972 adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, § 620.56 et seq., Fla.Stat., F.S.A., we can find no authority in the Act which would permit a partnership to sue in its firm nam…
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Puntasecca v. State, 172 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…d in the plan and was discovered in possession of a part of the stolen goods for which no explanation was offered by the defense. The judgment of guilty as to Eugene F. Puntasecca must be affirmed upon authority of the rule stated in Edge v. State, 96 Fla. 796, 119 So. 332 (1928) which is set forth as follows: “There is * * * no presumption of law flowing from the unexplained possession of goods recently stolen that the possessor stole them. It is only when such possession is unexplained that guilt may b…
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Bland Waters and Hamp Andrews, JR. v. State, 158 Fla. 456 (Fla. 1947)…[*457] PER CURIAM The judgment is affirmed on authority of Thompson v. State, 58 Fla. 106, 50 So. 507, and authorities there cited. See also Edge v. State, 96 Fla. 796, 119 So. 332; Thompson v. State, 165 Fla. 250, 169 So. 657. So ordered. THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tilly v. State, 21 Fla. 242 (Fla. 1885)
- Kilkrease v. State, 96 Fla. 264 (Fla. 1928)
- Jasper Rimes v. State, 36 Fla. 90 (Fla. 1895)