GREGORY MONACO AND INTERSTATE TOWING, INC., A/K/A INTERSTATE TRANSPORT, APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORENCE NEALON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Monaco and Interstate Towing appealed the denial of their motion to quash service of process in a motor vehicle accident lawsuit. The court reversed, holding that the plaintiff failed to comply with statutory requirements for substituted service under Florida law, specifically the requirement to serve by registered or certified mail and file an affidavit of compliance.
The court held that the trial court erred in denying the motions to quash because Nealon failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements for substituted service. Specifically, she did not serve the defendants by registered or certified mail, did not file an affidavit of compliance, and failed to allege the statutory basis for invoking section 48.171 with respect to Interstate. Accordingly, the order denying the motions to quash was reversed.
[1] Substituted service of process under section 48.171, Florida Statutes, requires strict compliance with statutory requirements, including mailing a copy of the summons and…
[2] A complaint must allege the ultimate facts bringing a defendant within the purview of section 48.171, Florida Statutes, to support substituted service of process.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the statute allowing substituted service is an exception to the general rule requiring a defendant to be personally served, due process values require strict compliance with the statutory requirements.”
Establishes the strict compliance standard required for substituted service as an exception to normal service rules.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFlorence Nealon sued Gregory Monaco and Interstate Towing, Inc. arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Florida. Nealon attempted to serve the defe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Affidavit Of Compliance cases and more on FLexlaw
GROSS, J.
Gregory Monaco and Interstate Towing, Inc., appeal a non-final order denying their motion to quash service of process. This court has jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
Appellee, Florence Nealon, attempted to serve Monaco and Interstate pursuant to section 48.171, Florida Statutes (2000). In a lawsuit arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Florida, section 48.171 authorizes substituted service of process upon the secretary of state for motor vehicle owners (Interstate) or operators (Monaco) who are non-residents or have concealed their whereabouts. See id.
When using substituted service under section 48.171, a plaintiff such as Nealon must meet two requirements: 1) the complaint must allege the ultimate facts bringing the defendant within the purview of the statute, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(h); Farouki v. Attel et Cie, 682 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and 2) the service must strictly comply with section 48.161, Florida Statutes (2000), which sets forth the method of substituted service of process. See Mercy Lu Enters, v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 681 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Because the statute allowing substituted service is an exception to the general rule requiring a defendant to be personally served, due process values require strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Id.; see also Wyatt v. Haese, 649 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Chapman v. Sheffield, 750 So. 2d 140, 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Under section 48.161, the plaintiff must serve the secretary of state designated in section 48.171 and mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant by registered or certified mail. “The plaintiff must then file the return receipt for the papers mailed to the defendant along with an affidavit showing compliance with the applicable statute.” Chapman, 750 So. 2d at 142; see § 48.161(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); Wyatt, 649 So. 2d at 907.
In the case at hand, the record reflects no attempt by Nealon to serve either defendant by registered or certified mail, and contains no affidavit of compliance reflecting any attempt to serve them by mail. Nowhere in Nealon’s brief does she argue that she has complied with these statutory requirements. “Because service of process was not perfected, the trial court did not obtain jurisdiction” over either Monaco or Interstate. Mercy Lu, 681 So. 2d at 759. Failure to timely file an affidavit of compliance alone warrants quashing of the substituted service. Wyatt, 649 So. 2d at 907-08; Law Offices of Evan I. Fetteman v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 480 So. 2d 1382, 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Smith v. Import Birds, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
We also note that Nealon’s complaint fails to plead the statutory basis for invoking section 48.171 with respect to Interstate. “It is well settled that ‘[t]o support substituted service of process on a defendant, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute. If it fails to do so then a motion to quash process should be granted.’ ” Farouki, 682 So. 2d at 1186 (quoting Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)); see also Wiggam v. Bamford, 562 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“the complaint fails to allege that appellant is a nonresident or concealing herself. On that basis alone it is fatally defective.”).
The order denying Monaco’s and Interstate’s motions to quash service of process is reversed.
STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
-
Rufino Hernandez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 32 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…se the statute allowing substituted service is an exception to the general rule requiring a defendant to be personally served, there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements so as to protect due process guarantees. Monaco v. Nealon, 810 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Alvarado v. Cisneros, 919 So. 2d 585, 588-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). If the complaint fails to allege the jurisdictional requirements for substituted service as prescribed by the statute, a defendant cannot be properly served…
-
Alvarado v. Mirta Cisneros and Mario Cruz, 919 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…orida Statutes (2001).2 Because substituted service of process statutes provide an exception to the general rule that a defendant must be personally served, they must be strictly [*589] construed to protect due process guarantees. Monaco v. Nealon, 810 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); McAlice v. Kirsch, 868 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Thus, to serve the Secretary of State on behalf of a defendant motor vehicle operator or owner, the plaintiff must plead the jurisdictional basis either by tracking the…
-
Torres v. Arnco Constr., Inc., 867 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…4th DCA 2002). Indeed, because statutes authorizing substituted service are exceptions to the general rule requiring a defendant to be served personally, due process requires strict compliance with their statutory requirements. See Monaco v. Nealon, 810 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Mercy Lu Enters., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 681 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The statute governing the present case is section 48.031(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), reads in pertinent part: Service of original process…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Wyatt v. Haese, 649 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Nicolette Wiggam v. Bamford, 562 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Chapman v. Lottie F. Sheffield and her husband, 750 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- LAW Offs. OF Evan I. Fetterman v. Inter-Tel Inc., 480 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Fleming Blackwell Cooley, III v. Cooley, 461 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Mercy LU Enters., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 681 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Fawaz Farouki v. Attel et CIE, 682 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)