UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
CELIA VALE, APPELLEE
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Resnick, 636 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aries Ins. Co. v. Cayre, 785 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
JORGENSON, J., and NESBITT, Senior Judge, concur.
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
In this case involving the efficacy of a claimed notice of policy cancellation, I would reverse the judgment for the insured for a new trial because I believe the trial court prejudicially erred in denying the appellant’s requested instruction concerning the rebuttable “presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped and mailed was received by the addressee.” Brown v. Giffen Industr., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla.1973); accord Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855 (Fla.1955); Moses v. Bystrom, 489 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Brake v. State Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 473 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Berwick v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Rukab v. City OF Jacksonville Beach, 866 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Panama City Beach Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. State of Florida, 831 So. 2d 662 (Fla.2002); Rukab v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 811 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). DAVIS, BENTON and BROWNING, JJ., concur.…
-
Rawls v. Leon Cnty., 974 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…ly in its determination of necessity, the condemning authority, the County in this instance, has as an eviden-tiary obligation the requirement to put on “some evidence of reasonable necessity for the taking.” See Rukab v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 811 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). It did so here with the testimony of the engineer fortified by the introduction into evidence of the resolution of the Board of County Commissioners.4 “Once this is shown, however, the landowner must then either concede the exis…
-
Jamieson v. Town of Fort Myers Beach (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…ial taking claim." We do not read Palazzolo so narrowly. The language in Palazzolo makes it clear that notice of a - 9 - preexisting regulation does not operate as an absolute bar to a takings claim. See also Rukab v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 811 So. 2d 727, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("[W]e find no legal support for the contention that the [property owners] are somehow precluded from asserting their constitutional rights . . . because they bought the property subject to the previous determination of blig…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. Giffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973)
- Serv. Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1955)
- Berwick v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Brake v. State, 473 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Resnick, 636 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Moses v. Bystrom, 489 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Gillian Lord Breakspeare v. Lord, 785 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Henderson Nurse v. State, 785 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)