RAUL ARMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raul Armas appealed a certified question regarding whether the date a defendant files a notice of expiration of speedy trial should be counted toward the speedy trial deadline. The court held that under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, the filing date should not be counted, and affirmed the judgment and sentence.
No. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, which governs computation of time periods specified in the rules, the date on which the defendant files the notice of expiration is not to be counted, as Rule 3.040 provides that the day of the act or event from which the designated period begins to run is not to be included.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to reconsider a final disposition entered sua sponte without notice to the state or an opportunity to be heard, particularly in cases i…
[2] An order entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard is void and may be attacked at any time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, which specifies the method of computing any time period specified by these rules, provides in pertinent part: '[T]he day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.'”
Establishes the controlling rule for computing time periods in criminal procedure; directly answers the certified question
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Raul Armas was convicted and sentenced in county court. Following imposition of judgment and sentence, the trial court considered the state'…
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Defendant Raul Armas seeks discretionary review of a certified question of the County Court following imposition of judgment and sentence. The question asks:
SHOULD THE COURT COUNT THE DATE THAT DEFENDANT FILED HIS/HER NOTICE OF EXPIRATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL?
We accept jurisdiction, Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(4)(A).
As a threshold matter, we are not persuaded by defendant’s contention that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the state’s motion to vacate the discharge order entered sua sponte without notice to the state or an opportunity to be heard. The trial court may reconsider the correctness of a final disposition in cases involving “fraud, mistake, inadvertence, misconduct, or the like[.]” See Acosta v. State, 515 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). See also Metropolitan Dade County v. Curry, 632 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(“order entered without notice or opportunity to be heard is a void order ... and may be attacked at any time”).
As to the merits, we answer the certified question in the negative. In Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022, 115 S.Ct. 589, 130 L.Ed.2d 502 (1994), the Florida Supreme Court clearly applied Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040 to the computation of any time period specified in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. “Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, which specifies the method of computing any time period specified by these rules, provides in pertinent part: ‘[T]he day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.... ’ ” Vining, 637 So. 2d at 925. See State v. Naveira, 768 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); State v. Edwards, 528 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 534 So. 2d 399 (Fla.1988); State v. McFarland, 747 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 767 So. 2d 458 (Fla.2000). Following Rule 3.040’s dictate, the date on which the defendant files the notice of expiration is not to be counted, notwithstanding any language in Committee Notes that may seem to contradict Rule 3.040. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Gillis, 876 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…s notice that the speedy trial period under Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(a) had expired on May 15, 2003. Thus, the State had fifteen days under the so-called recapture window, i.e., until May 30, 2003, to try its case against the defendant. Armas v. State, 811 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.040, 3.191(p)(3) (2004). When the court dismissed the case against the defendant on May 20, 2003, there were ten days left within the recapture window during which appellee could have mitigated, if not completel…
Authorities Cited
- Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994)
- Sports v. Vaughn, 513 U.S. 1022 (U.S. 1994)
- Bedford v. California, 513 U.S. 1022 (U.S. 1994)
- State v. Edwards, 528 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- State v. Naveira, 768 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Curry, 632 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Barge v. State, 747 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- State v. McFARLAND, 747 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Acosta v. State, 515 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)