RICHARD BUCCI AND GREGORY INTREGLIA, APPELLANTS,
v.
DANIEL W. MONES, P.A. AND FRANK M. MARKS, ESQUIRE, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 2002-03-06
No. 3D01-592
Before COPE, FLETCHER and SORONDO, JJ.
812 So. 2d 471 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

Contractors Richard Bucci and Gregory Intreglia appealed a summary judgment dismissing their legal malpractice claim against their former defense attorneys. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the attorneys' negligence proximately caused damages to Bucci, but that summary judgment was properly entered as to Intreglia.


Holding

Summary judgment was improper as to Richard Bucci because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the attorneys' alleged negligence proximately caused injury. The joint venture agreement was ambiguous and, read favorably to the contractors, did not eliminate all compensation for work performed. Summary judgment was properly entered as to Gregory Intreglia.


Headnotes

[1] Summary judgment is improper when a joint venture agreement is ambiguous regarding the extent of compensation owed to a party.

[2] A legal malpractice claim may proceed if the attorneys' alleged negligence in failing to assert a counterclaim was the proximate cause of the client's injury.

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Key Quotes

“For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the attorneys do not dispute the allegations of negligence. The attorneys argue that assuming they were negligent, such negligence was not the proximate cause of any injury to their clients, the contractors.”

Establishes the key issue on appeal: whether negligence was the proximate cause of damages, not whether negligence occurred.

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Facts & Procedural History

Bucci, a general contractor, and Intreglia, his agent and project manager, entered a construction contract for commercial property improvements. When …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Richard Bucci and Gregory Intreglia appeal an adverse summary judgment in their action for legal malpractice. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Bucci is a general contractor and Intreg-lia is his agent and project manager. They entered a contract for the improvement of certain commercial property. The owner sued them, alleging breach of contract.

Bucci and Intreglia (“the contractors”) retained Daniel W. Mones, P.A., and Frank M. Marks (“the attorneys”) to defend them. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment against Bucci for $55,100 and Intreglia for $10,000.

The contractors sued the attorneys for legal malpractice, alleging that they had not properly defended the case. The trial court granted the attorneys’ motion for summary judgment, and the contractors have appealed.

For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the attorneys do not dispute the allegations of negligence. The attorneys argue that assuming they were negligent, such negligence was not the proximate cause of any injury to their clients, the contractors.

We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on this issue. The affidavits and other materials filed by the contractors assert that under the applicable agreements, the contractors were owed $86,000 and that the attorneys failed to make a counterclaim for that amount.

The attorneys reply that this claim is negated by a joint venture agreement which the contractors entered into with the property owner while the construction project was under way. We conclude that the joint venture agreement is ambiguous. Read in the light most favorable to the contractors, the joint venture agreement entitled the contractors to payment at a reduced rate, but did not eliminate all compensation for work on the job.

The contractors had also been charged with unreasonable delay in the work on the construction project. The contractors contended that the attorneys failed to offer a viable defense, namely, that the delays were attributable to the numerous change orders initiated by the owner, and not to any dereliction on the part of the contractors. For the reasons stated, summary judgment should not have been entered with regard to the claim of Richard Bueci.*

We conclude that the summary judgment was correctly entered as to Gregory Intreglia, and affirm it.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

*

On this appeal, the attorneys have abandoned the issues concerning the fictitious name and the failure to appeal the underlying action. Consequently, we do not address those issues here.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Stokes v. State, 884 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Teal v. State, 862 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); McCall v. State, 862 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); O’Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Wright v. State, 834 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 831 So. 2d 671 (Fla.2002). As this court did in both Teal and McCall, we certify direct conflict with Richardson v. State, 884 So. 2d 950, 2003 WL 21697171 (Fla. 4th DCA July 23, 2003). Affirmed; conflict certified.…

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