ERIC SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eric Smith appealed his conviction and sentence for armed robbery and aggravated assault, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress statements obtained after an allegedly illegal stop and the trial court's imposition of sentences under both the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA) and the 10-20-Life statute. The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion but reversed the concurrent sentencing scheme under the 10-20-Life statute as violating Florida law.
The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the BOLO and the totality of circumstances. However, the trial court erred in imposing sentences under section 775.082(3)(a) because when a defendant qualifies for PRRPA sentencing, a trial court may not impose a separate sentencing statute sentence equal to the PRRPA sentence; only if it is greater may it be imposed. The consecutive nature of sentences under 10-20-Life does not make them greater for this analysis.
[1] A BOLO, even without specific descriptions, can support an investigatory stop based on the totality of the circumstances, including an officer's immediate contact with a…
[2] A trial court may not impose a sentence under a separate sentencing statute that is equal to a sentence imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“even if a BOLO lacks specific descriptions, it will support an investigatory stop based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the officer's immediate contact with the defendant after hearing the BOLO and the defendant's suspicious conduct consistent with guilt”
Establishes the legal standard for stops based on BOLO broadcasts and supports affirmance of the denial of the suppression motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated assault. He was stopped based on a BOLO (Be On the Lookout) that had been broadcast to investigati…
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WARNER, J.
In this appeal from appellant’s conviction and sentence for armed robbery and aggravated assault, he contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements on the ground that they were the product of an illegal stop. We affirm because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion supplied by the BOLO received by the investigating officer. See Pierre-Louis v. State, 682 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that even if a BOLO lacks specific descriptions, it will support an investigatory stop based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s immediate contact with the defendant after hearing the BOLO and the defendant’s suspicious conduct consistent with guilt).
Appellant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him under both section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (“PRRPA”), and section 775.082(3)(a) (“10-20-Life”). The court sentenced appellant under the PRRPA to life for robbery with a firearm, five years each for two counts of aggravated assault, and fifteen years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, all to run concurrently. Pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a), the court
imposed the same prison terms for each count but ordered that each was to run consecutively. In Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000), the court held that when the defendant qualifies for sentencing under the PRRPA, a trial court may not sentence a defendant to a sentence under a separate sentencing statute that is equal to the PRRPA sentence. Only where the separate sentence is greater than the PRRPA sentence may it be imposed.
In this case, the sentences entered pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a) were not greater than the PRRPA sentences. We reject the state’s contention that because the “10-20-Life” sentences were to run consecutively, they were thus greater than the PRRPA sentence. The court’s power to run sentences consecutively is not the criterion to determine whether a separate sentencing statute is greater than a sentence under the PRRPA; rather, it is the sentence that appears on the face of the statute that governs. We therefore reverse and remand to vacate those sentences imposed under section 775.087(2)(a).
FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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McDONALD v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007)…cDonald was properly categorized as a “prison releasee reoffender” under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000). .Sitting en banc, the Fourth District expressly receded from the following cases in McDonald, 912 So. 2d at 76-77: Smith v. State, 813 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Brady v. State, 839 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Scott v. State, 842 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Hill v. State, 862 So. 2d 815, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Hill v. State, 869 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA), review…
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Scott v. State, 842 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…775.087(2)(a), [*1055] Florida Statutes (“10-20-Life”). The mandatory minimum sentences imposed were not greater than appellant’s life sentences as a Prison Releasee Reoffender. Therefore, they are illegal and must be set aside. See Smith v. State, 813 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(reversing and remanding for resentencing where sentence pursuant to 10-20-Life statute was not greater than the PRRPA sentences); see also Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000). Appellant filed a motion pursuant…
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Hill v. State, 862 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…ant meets the requirements for sentencing under the PRRPA, a trial court may not sentence the defendant under another sentencing statute where the sentence under the other statute is equal or lesser than that imposed under the PRRPA. Smith v. State, 813 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) [*816] (citing Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000)). A defendant who qualifies for sentencing under the PRRPA may be sentenced under another sentencing statute only when the sentence under the other statute is gr…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- Pierre-Louis v. State, 682 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)