VAUGHN IRVIN, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Rico Correa v. State, 43 So. 3d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
  ….” Cofer, 28 So. 3d at 929 (Hazouri, J., concurring). In two other cases, evidence from the monitoring equipment established the subject’s noncompliance with curfew or other activity restrictions. See Anthony, 854 So. 2d at 746-48; Alarcon v. State, 814 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).12 [*744] In this case, Mr. Correa was charged with violating special condition (54) of his community control, which is described entirely as, “GPS monitor while on CC.” He was also charged with violating standard condition…
• Dias v. State, 890 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
  …ty and is “[a] statement by a person specifically authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject....” See § 90.803(18)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). It applies when a third person is speaking on behalf of another. See, e.g., Alarcon v. State, 814 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In this ease, it is the defendant’s own non-verbal response to the deputy’s question that is at issue. Thus, subsection (a) applies. The trial court properly overruled the defendant’s objection and admitted the deputy’s testimo…
• Garcia-Rodriguez v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
  …ble hearsay. In theory, he is right. See Laing v. State, 200 So. 3d 166, 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (stating that GPS data offered to prove that the probationer was at specific locations on particular dates is "definitive hearsay"); Alarcon v. State, 814 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (concluding that community control officer's recounting of statements made by the defendant via an interpreter were inadmissible hearsay where "no facts were adduced . . . to bring the [CCO's] testimony within the section 9…

Authorities Cited

• Taylor v. First Nat'l Bank OF Chicago under that certain pooling & servicing agreement dated as of September 1, 789 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)