JAMES RICH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Rich appealed his habitual violent felony offender sentence, arguing that on resentencing, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish his qualification for the enhanced sentence. The court reversed, holding that resentencing constitutes a new proceeding requiring the State to introduce evidence anew rather than relying on evidence from the original sentencing hearing.
The State was required to introduce evidence at the resentencing hearing proving Rich qualified for enhanced sentencing. Resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding, and the trial court erred by relying on evidence from the original sentencing without requiring the State to reprove the validity of Rich's prior convictions.
[1] A resentencing following a reversal is a new proceeding.
[2] In a new sentencing proceeding, the State must introduce evidence to prove a defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding”
Establishes the foundational principle that resentencing is not merely a continuation of the original proceeding but a distinct proceeding to which ordinary procedural requirements apply.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRich was originally sentenced as a violent career criminal. He appealed, arguing the sentencing scheme violated the single subject rule, and this cour…
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[*1208] STEVENSON, J.
James Rich appeals his habitual violent felony offender sentence, arguing that, on resentencing, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he qualified for an habitual violent felony offender sentence. We find merit in his position and reverse.
This is the second time that Rich has appealed his sentence to this court. Originally, Rich was sentenced as a violent career criminal. Rich appealed his sentence, arguing that the violent career criminal sentencing scheme was enacted in violation of the single subject rule. This court agreed, reversed his sentence, and remanded the case so that Rich could be resentenced. See Rich v. State, 765 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
On remand, the trial court vacated Rich’s violent career criminal sentence and a new sentencing hearing was held, resulting in his current habitual violent felony offender sentence. In imposing the new sentence, however, over defense objection, the trial judge relied upon evidence that had been presented by the State at the original sentencing hearing. While certified copies of Rich’s prior convictions and documentation regarding his release from incarceration for such convictions were introduced into evidence at the hearing that resulted in the violent career criminal sentence, they were not introduced into evidence at the new sentencing hearing. Instead the court simply made reference to the prior proceeding and imposed the habitual violent felony offender sentence, despite the defendant’s objections that a proper predicate for the enhanced sentence had not been laid.
On appeal, Rich contends that the State could not simply rely upon evidence introduced at a prior sentencing proceeding and that, in the absence of evidence establishing that he qualifies for habitual violent felony offender sentencing, he is entitled to reversal of his sentence.
We agree. This court has previously held that “a resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding.” Cameron v. State, 807 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(citing Altman v. State, 756 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)); see also Mills v. State, 724 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
As such, the State was required to introduce evidence that proved Rich qualified for enhanced sentencing. See Mills, 724 So. 2d at 173-74 (reversing the sentence imposed upon the defendant at resentencing where the trial court failed to require the State to “reprove” the validity of the defendant’s prior convictions).
Since no such evidence was introduced at the resentencing, we reverse Rich’s habitual violent felony offender sentence. On remand, the State will have the opportunity to introduce evidence establishing that Rich qualifies for an habitual violent felony offender sentence. See Cameron, 807 So. 2d at 747.1
REVERSED and REMANDED.
POLEN, C.J., and STONE, J., concur. . Of course, our experience suggests that in most instances, at resentencing hearings in front of the original sentencing judge, the parties usually rely heavily on stipulations unless there is some genuine concern about the existence, or authenticity, of the evidence.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2007)…he issues in the prior sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., Tubwell v. State, 922 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that because resentencing is de novo, “the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses”); Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that at a resentencing, the State must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing); Baldwin v. State, 700 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stat…
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Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2008)…rden of proof during a resentencing proceeding. See Tubwell v. State, 922 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (discussing that “the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses” during the resentencing proceeding); Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (discussing that evidence being presented during the prior sentencing with regard to the defendant’s qualification for enhanced sentencing was not sufficient to establish that fact during the most recent sentencing proceedi…
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State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2011)…as not permitted to present new evidence at his resentencing and stating that “[o]ur remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing” at which “both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence”); see also Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that at resentenc-ing, the State must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing). The trial court has discretion at resentencing — within certain cons…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cameron v. State, 807 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Altman v. State, 756 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Mills v. State, 724 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Rich v. State, 765 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)