ERIC RUSSELL LEWIS AND MARY LOUGHRAN LEWIS, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
JAMES C. EDWARDS, THE SEMINOLE DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ROBERT EPSTEIN, APPELLEES
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The court held that the Seminole Department of Law Enforcement is immune from suit under sovereign immunity, but the officer's immunity is questionable based on the scope of his employment.
Plaintiffs were injured when a car they were riding in was struck by a vehicle being chased by a law enforcement officer. The officer was employed by …
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SHAHOOD, J.
Appellants, Eric Russell Lewis and Mary Loughran Lewis (the Lewises) were injured when the car in which they were riding was struck by a vehicle which was being chased by appellee, Officer Robert Epstein (Epstein). Epstein was employed by appellee, The Seminole Department of Law Enforcement (SDLE). The Lewises’ filed suit against Epstein and SDLE; the complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
We affirm the dismissal of the complaint against SDLE. See Houghtaling v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 611 So. 2d 1235 (Fla.1993)(holding that Florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an Indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity); see also Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 1702, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998)(holding that “as a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity”). With regard to Epstein, however, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint because it is unclear whether he was acting within the course and scope of his employment. There is a factual dispute whether the chase began on or off of reservation property, as well as a legal question concerning Epstein’s authority to engage in a chase in order to investigate an expired license tag.1 See e.g. City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 1226 (Fla.1992)(holding that sovereign immunity shields only those acts which are “discretionary” in nature, and not “operational”).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
TAYLOR, J., and ANGELOS, CYNTHIA, Associate Judge, concur. . Under Florida law, if the tag is expired fewer than six months, the violation is a noncriminal traffic violation. See § 320.07(3), Fla. Stat. (2000). If the tag has been expired for more than six months, the violation is a second degree misdemeanor. Id.
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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Manzini (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…to the tribe is illusory if the tribe is required to defend an action barred by the doctrine.” Id. Thus, the Seminole Tribe “is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity[.]” Lewis v. Edwards, 815 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998)). We have previously explained that “a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” Seminole Police Dep…
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Seminole Tribe of Fla., Inc. v. Webster (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…Seminole Tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity over all claims unless such immunity is abrogated by Congress or waived by the Seminole Tribe.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Manzini, 361 So. 3d 883, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); see also Lewis v. Edwards, 815 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Waivers must be “clear, explicit, and unmistakable.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Napoleoni, 890 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Further, a waiver “must be strictly construed with any ambiguities being resolved…
Authorities Cited
- Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (U.S. 1998)
- City OF Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1992)
- Houghtaling v. Seminole Tribe OF Florida, 611 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1993)