ERIC M. COOK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eric Cook appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence imposed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that he received a habitual felony offender enhancement without proper notice. The court affirms, holding that challenges to the procedural process of seeking enhanced sentencing are not cognizable under rule 3.800(a) and must instead be raised through rule 3.850.
A habitual offender sentence is illegal under rule 3.800(a) only if either the terms or conditions of the sentence exceed those authorized by section 775.084 or a prior offense essential to categorize the defendant as a habitual offender does not actually exist. Cook's challenge to the procedural process of seeking habitual felony offender sentencing is not cognizable under rule 3.800(a) and must be raised through a rule 3.850 motion instead.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is limited to challenges regarding the substance of the sentence itself, not the…
[2] A habitual offender sentence is illegal for purposes of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) only if the sentence terms exceed statutory authorization or if a pred…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] habitual offender sentence is illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a) only if: (1) the terms or conditions of the sentence exceed those authorized by section 775.084 for the adjudicated offense, or (2) a prior offense essential to categorize the defendant as a habitual offender does not actually exist.”
Establishes the limited scope of what constitutes an illegal habitual offender sentence under rule 3.800(a)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCook pleaded no contest to sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of a church. The trial court sentenced him as a habitual felony …
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PER CURIAM.
Eric Cook appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Because Cook has sought relief not available through a rule 3.800 motion, we affirm.
Cook pleaded no contest to one count of sale of cocaine within 1000 feet of a church and one count of possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of a church. The trial court subsequently sentenced Cook as a habitual felony offender. In his rule 3.800 motion, Cook asserts that he was not advised of the State’s intent to seek habitual felony offender sentencing before he entered his plea and that the State never provided him with written notice of its intent to seek such enhanced sentencing. Therefore, according to Cook, his habitual felony sentence is illegal. The trial court denied Cook’s motion on the basis that Cook’s challenge was not to the substance of the sentence itself but, rather, was to the procedural process used in imposing the sentence. The trial court found that this type of challenge was inappropriate in the context of a rule 3.800 motion. This appeal followed.
[A] habitual offender sentence is illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a) only if: (1) the terms or conditions of the sentence exceed those authorized by section 775.084 for the adjudicated offense, or (2) a prior offense essential to categorize the defendant as a habitual offender does not actually exist.
Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (en banc). The proper vehicle to challenge the State’s alleged failure to properly seek habitual felony offender sentencing is a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id.
In this case, Cook does not deny that his habitual felony offender sentence is within the sentencing range provided by section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2001). Cook also does not deny that he had the qualifying predicate offenses for habitual felony offender sentencing. Because Cook’s allegations do not establish that his habitual felony sentence is illegal for purposes of rule 3.800, the trial court properly denied the motion.
While we affirm the trial court’s order in this case, our affirmance is without prejudice to any right Cook may have to file a properly sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 addressing this issue. Such motion shall not be considered successive.
Affirmed.
PARKER, SALCINES, and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.
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Cited By (25 total)
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Stanford LaMAR v. State, 823 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…trial coürt failed to show that a habitual offender sentencing enhancement was necessary for the protection of the public. These challenges are not properly raised under rule 3.800(a). See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.2001); Cook v. State, 816 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)). While the trial court did not summarily deny these latter two claims for this reason, we affirm its denial of relief for the reason stated above. [*232] Affirme…
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Clayton v. State, 904 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…ing habitual offender sentencing. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Clayton’s motion. Claims that the procedural requirements of the habitual offender statute were not followed are not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding. See Cook v. State, 816 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Hope v. State, 766 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). AFFIRMED. PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.…
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Bradley v. State, 903 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…Affirmed. See Gipson v. State, 616 So. 2d 992 (Fla.1993); State v. McCloud, 577 So. 2d 939 (Fla.1991); Castle v. State, 330 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1976); Boyd v. State, 880 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 888 So. 2d 621 (Fla.2004); Cook v. State, 816 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Ishmael v. State, 735 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Plowman v. State, 586 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Middleton v. State, 721 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). After this court held in Boyd, 880 So. 2d at 728, that a claim of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)