RICHARD MORT, APPELLANT,

v.

KATHRYN MORT, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• GIL v. State, 118 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 2013)
  …ion (5) do not constitute double jeopardy.” Id. at 1003. This Court granted review of Gil based upon express and direct conflict with the decisions in Dees v. State, 54 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), Duff, 942 So. 2d at 926, and Franklin v. State, 816 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In these cases, the First, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal held that dual convictions under sections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) are prohibited. The Dees and Franklin decisions do not discuss double jeopardy with regard…
• Duff v. State, 942 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
  …oked as a habitual traffic offender is proscribed in section 322.34(5). Because these crimes are mutually exclusive, the Fourth District has held, without using the phrase “double jeopardy,” that dual convictions cannot stand. See Franklin v. State, 816 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The second problem with the State’s attempt to distinguish Roedel is that it ignores the degree variants portion of Roedel’s analysis. Although the crimes in Roedel were slightly different than those in the instant case, its an…
• Dees v. State, 54 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
  …(Count III). All three counts arose out of the same offense. We affirm the appellant’s conviction on Count I without discussion. We reverse the appellant’s conviction on Count II because Counts I and II are mutually exclusive. See Franklin v. State, 816 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We also reverse the appellant’s conviction on Count III. Dual convictions on Counts I and III violate double jeopardy because Count III is a necessarily lesser-included offense of Count I. See § 775.021(4)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2009…