TIMOTHY MARTIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Timothy Martin appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion seeking credit for gain time promised at sentencing. The trial court had promised Martin five years of credit on his nine-year sentence but the Department of Corrections did not apply the full credit. The appellate court remanded for the trial court to reconsider whether it intended to honor the plea bargain credit or allow Martin to withdraw his plea.
The trial court had jurisdiction to revise Martin's sentence to reflect the promised five-year credit without requiring a plea withdrawal. If the trial court intended the five-year credit as part of the plea bargain, it may revise the sentence accordingly. If not, Martin must be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
[1] A trial court's promise of credit for time served at sentencing must be honored, even if statutory provisions would otherwise reduce that credit.
[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction to resentence a defendant to effectuate the intent of a plea bargain, even after the defendant has sought to withdraw the plea.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“They'll cut the five.... They have to by law. Trust me they will. I guarantee they will.”
The trial court's explicit promise to Martin at sentencing regarding the five-year credit to be applied by the state.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMartin was resentenced to nine years in the Department of Corrections. At sentencing, the trial court promised Martin credit for five years from his o…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jurisdiction To Resentence cases and more on FLexlaw
PLEUS, J.
The appellant, Timothy Martin (“Martin”), challenges the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion1 on the ground that he failed to receive credit for previous gain time as promised by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court resen-tenced Martin to “nine years Department of Corrections with credit for the five years — well, the State will give him credit for that.” When Martin specifically questioned the trial court how the state would give him this credit, the trial court stated to Martin: “They’ll cut the five.... They have to by law. Trust me they will. I guarantee they will.” The written sentence, however, without any markings for state prison time credit to be applied, indicated that Martin was to be sentenced to a term of nine years. Pursuant to statutory provisions calling for the loss of gain time upon the revocation of probation, the Department of Corrections apparently did not credit Martin’s new sentence for the entire five year period of the original sentence, but rather for actual time served. See § 944.28, Flat. Stat. (1999).
In the Rule 3.850 hearing held in this matter, the same trial court conceded that Martin was entitled to withdraw his plea, but failed to consider the possibility that, alternatively, Martin was entitled to the benefit of his plea bargain. The transcript of the Rule 3.850 hearing indicates the trial court believed it lacked jurisdiction to resentence the appellant without a withdrawal of the plea first taking place. The trial court did, however, have such jurisdiction and authority. Flowers v. State, 754 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Foldi v. State, 695 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
We remand for the trial court to reconsider this matter. If, under the plea bargain, it was the trial court’s specific intent that Martin was to receive a five year state prison credit on his nine year state prison sentence, then Martin’s sentence can be revised in accord with that intent. Flowers; see also Jackson v. State, 615 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (a defendant’s sentence is whatever the trial court intended it to be). If the trial court chooses not to sentence Martin pursuant to the plea, the trial court should again give Martin the opportunity to withdraw it.2
REMANDED.
SHARP, W., and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Fla. R.Crim. Pro. 3.850 (2001).
. Of course, in any resentencing, a court shall not vindictively impose a harsher sentence, a fear that Martin apparently had when the state suggested it would not go along with the sentence it agreed to earlier. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…such a forfeiture cannot thwart the terms contemplated in a plea agreement. See Barnett, 933 So. 2d at 1269; Dellahoy, 816 So. 2d at 1253. We vacate the trial court’s denial of Dellofa-no’s motion and remand for reconsideration. See Martin v. State, 816 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). If Dellofano’s allegations are correct, the trial court should either resentence him in a manner that effectuates the plea agreement after considering the DOC forfeiture of gain time or allow him to withdraw his plea. See Della-…
-
McALLISTER v. State, 821 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…can still effectuate the purpose of the plea agreement by either resentencing the appellant in a manner that will effectuate the plea agreement given the DOC’s forfeiture, or by allowing the appellant to withdraw from his plea. See Martin v. State, 816 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Flowers v. State, 754 So. 2d 65, 66-67 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Williams v. Department of Corrections, 734 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Foldi v. State, 695 So. 2d 886, 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). It is clear from the language of…
-
Rogers v. State, 864 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…on of probation). After the issuance of Jackson, this court continued to hold [*523] that 3.850 relief is available when the trial court promises full prison credit, but the Department of Corrections subsequently forfeits gain time. Martin v. State, 816 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Therefore, the procedural denial of Roger’s 3.850 motion is reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to consider the involuntary plea claim on the merits. REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions. PETERSON and PALM…
Authorities Cited
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969)
- Jackson v. State, 615 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Carlton Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Foldi v. State, 695 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Flowers v. State, 754 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)