PAUL WIGGINS III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Paul Wiggins challenged a trial court's summary denial of his postconviction motion for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which the trial court treated as a 3.800(a) motion regarding sentence legality and prison/jail credit. The appellate court affirmed the denial of most grounds but reversed and remanded regarding Wiggins' entitlement to prison credit against sentences imposed upon probation revocation.
Wiggins is entitled to prison credit against the sentences imposed upon probation revocation for time previously served in prison on the two counts prior to his release on probation. His jail credit claim is affirmed as facially insufficient, but without prejudice to file a facially sufficient motion seeking jail credit from the date a detainer was placed on him while serving a different prison sentence.
[1] A motion seeking prison credit for time served prior to release on probation is cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
[2] A defendant is entitled to credit against sentences imposed upon revocation of probation for time spent in prison on the original counts prior to release on probation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Wiggins' claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion, and he is entitled to credit against the sentences imposed upon revocation of probation for the time he spent in prison on the two counts prior to his release on probation.”
Establishes the core holding that Wiggins qualifies for prison credit and the legal basis for the remedy
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn October 1990, Wiggins was sentenced to five and one-half years in prison followed by two years' probation on two counts, to be served concurrently.…
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COVINGTON, Judge.
Paul Wiggins challenges the order of the trial court summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief. Wiggins filed his motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850; however, because the motion raised issues relating to the legality of Wiggins’ sentences and also sought an award of prison and jail credit, the trial court treated the motion as filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
We affirm without comment the denial of all but one of the grounds in Wiggins’ motion, and we reverse that portion of the order denying Wiggins’ prison credit claim and remand for an award of prison credit. In October 1990, Wiggins was sentenced on each of two counts to five and one-half years in prison followed by two years’probation. Those sentences were to be served concurrently. According to Wiggins’ motion and the trial court’s order, after his release from prison in 1991, he was arrested and sentenced to prison on a new offense, thereby violating his probation. The attachments to the trial court’s order show that in March 2000 Wiggins was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment concurrent on each count on the violation of probation.
Wiggins requested “credit for all time previously served in prison and county jail.” The trial court stated in its order that it had awarded Wiggins credit for all time served.
However, in the written sentences filed upon revocation of probation, the box awarding credit for time previously served in prison was left blank. Wiggins’ claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion, and he is entitled to credit against the sentences imposed upon revocation of probation for the time he spent in prison on the two counts prior to his release on probation. See Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order as it relates to Wiggins’ prison credit claim and remand with instructions to the trial court to correct the sentences to reflect that Wiggins is entitled to prison credit.1 See id.
Wiggins’ jail credit claim is facially insufficient because he neither alleges the amount of credit to which he is entitled nor the dates of his confinement in.the county jail.
Furthermore, the written sentences show that Wiggins was awarded 109 days’ jail credit for the time he spent in county jail prior to sentencing on the revocation of probation.
However, if Polk County placed a detainer on Wiggins on these counts while he was serving a sentence in state prison on another case, Wiggins would be entitled to credit against the prison sentences imposed upon revocation of probation from the date the detainer was lodged with the Department of Corrections. See Keene v. State, 816 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We therefore affirm the denial of Wiggins’ jail credit claim. Our affirmance is without prejudice to any right Wiggins might have to file a facially sufficient rule 3.800(a) motion or a timely, facially sufficient rule 3.850 motion seeking jail credit from the date a detainer was placed on him while he was serving a different prison sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
BLUE, C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., concur. . We note that because Wiggins’ offense occurred after October 1, 1989, unless the trial court states in the written sentences that Wiggins’ gain time is retained, it is automatically forfeited. Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888 (Fla.2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Armstrong v. State, 846 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ed Armstrong to prison for violating his probation, the trial court checked the appropriate box on the sentencing document ordering the Department of Corrections to compute and apply credit for time previously served in prison. See Wiggins v. State, 817 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Therefore, the trial court has completed its responsibility, and any challenge Armstrong may have regarding the application of prison credit to his sentence should be raised th…
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Stathas v. State, 852 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…urt must award such credit by court order. It appears that he is referring to his entitlement to prison credit for the time he served on the prison portions of his split sentences before he began serving the probation portions. See Wiggins v. State, 817 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). However, Stathas’ claim is facially insufficient because he did not allege that his entitlement to relief is apparent from the face of the record, nor did he allege how and where his entitlement to relief is demonstrated from the…
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Dorminey v. State, 837 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ld be entitled to immediate release if awarded the proper amount of prison credit. The circuit court stated that such a claim is not within its province. We disagree. Claims for prison credit are cognizable under rule 3.800(a). See Wiggins v. State, 817 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Therefore, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to expeditiously consider. Dorminey’s claim for prison credit. Last, Dorminey claims that he is entitled to additional jail credit because he was arrested on the Hillsboroug…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2000)
- Keene v. State, 816 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Cummings v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)