BERNARD B. ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bernard Robinson appealed his convictions for aggravated felony fleeing and eluding, cannabis possession, and resisting a law enforcement officer. The sole issue warranting discussion was whether the trial court properly admitted a cigar allegedly containing marijuana based on an arresting officer's opinion testimony. The court affirmed, holding that the officer was sufficiently qualified to identify marijuana by appearance and odor.
The trial court did not err in admitting the cigar. A law enforcement officer with adequate experience and training in narcotics may qualify as an expert witness to identify marijuana by its appearance and odor without chemical or scientific testing. The trial court's discretionary determination that the officer possessed sufficient qualifications was not an abuse of discretion.
[1] A witness may be qualified as an expert based on knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to render an opinion if it will assist the jury in determining a fac…
[2] The identification of illegal drugs may be proven by expert witnesses, and chemical or scientific testing is not necessary for the state to prove that a particular substa…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A witness may be qualified as an expert based on his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to render an opinion if it will assist the jury in determining a fact in issue.”
Establishes the legal standard for expert witness qualification under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn arresting officer discovered a cigar in Robinson's car and testified that it contained marijuana based on his training, four years of experience ha…
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SAWAYA, J.
Bernard Robinson appeals from his convictions and sentence for aggravated felony fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer, possession of cannabis and resisting a law enforcement officer without violence. Robinson was sentenced to fifteen years’ incarceration, consecutive to an already existing five-year prison sentence for violating probation. Of the issues Robinson raises, the only one that warrants discussion is whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a cigar allegedly rolled with marijuana based upon an arresting officer’s opinion that the cigar was a “blunt” containing marijuana. We affirm.
At trial, one of the arresting officers testified that the cigar discovered in Robinson’s car contained marijuana. The officer’s conclusion was based on his training, four years of experience handling marijuana, and Robinson’s own admission, as well as the cigar’s form, odor and appearance. When the State sought to admit the “blunt” into evidence, Robinson objected, arguing, inter alia, that the State failed to sufficiently prove that the substance in the cigar was marijuana because the officer was not qualified to give an expert opinion on this issue. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the cigar into evidence.
A witness may be qualified as an expert based on his or her knowledge, skill, expe rience, training or education to render an opinion if it will assist the jury in determining a fact in issue. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2001). The courts generally agree that the identification of illegal drugs may be proven by expert witnesses. Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla.2000); J.S. v. State, 691 So. 2d 20, 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (citing Pama v. State, 552 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); A.A. v. State, 461 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)); State v. Raulerson, 403 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).1 Therefore, chemical or scientific testing is not necessary for the state to prove that a particular substance is an illegal drug. J.S.; Raulerson. A law enforcement officer, for example, with adequate experience with narcotics can identify a substance as marijuana by its appearance and odor. J.S.; Raulerson.
Robinson specifically contends that the officer who testified was not qualified to render an opinion that the substance in the cigar was marijuana. However, “[i]t is within the trial court’s discretion to determine a witness’s qualifications to express an opinion as an expert, and the court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.” Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 892 (citations omitted); see also Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1989). The trial court found that the arresting officer had sufficient training and experience with marijuana to qualify him to render an opinion that the substance was indeed marijuana. We see nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in making this decision.
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R. B., JJ., concur. . The Florida Supreme Court held in Brooks that an experienced dealer of crack cocaine was qualified to testify that the retrieved substance was crack cocaine and that each rock weighed approximately one gram. See also Raulerson. Although here we are not confronted with the specter of the state in a criminal prosecution attempting to qualify a drug dealer as an expert witness to identify illegal narcotics, if a drug dealer may qualify as an expert identifier of illegal narcotics, his antithesis, a law enforcement officer, may certainly qualify despite the fact that each acquires the requisite knowledge, skill, training, and experience in very different ways.
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Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199 (Fla. 2009)…g that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a witness was not qualified to testify as an expert because he did not hold a doctoral degree). The expert must have adequate experience with the subject matter. See Robinson v. State, 818 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The qualifications proffered by Chavez do not demonstrate that Mr. Amezaga had sufficiently developed specialized knowledge of, or that he had adequate experience with, the comparative study of the Cuban and American legal…
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Kidd v. State, 855 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…that makes the designation in the first place. Nicholson v. State, 846 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). This is contrary to the position taken by two of our sister courts who view sexual predator designations as civil in nature. See Smeltz v. State, 818 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (trial court could treat a defendant’s rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence attacking his sexual predator designation as a motion for relief from judgment under rule 1.540); Jackson v. State, 801 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2…
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Jones v. State (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2015)…v. State, 982 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). It is within the trial court's discretion to determine a witness's qualifications as an expert and that determination will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Robinson v. State, 818 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). An abuse of discretion should not be found unless the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary or fanciful, or unless no reasonable person would take the trial court’s view. Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1159 (Fla. 2006).…
Authorities Cited
- Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2000)
- Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989)
- A.A. v. State, 461 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- State v. Raulerson, 403 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- LEE v. State, 552 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- J.S. v. State, 691 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)