BLAKE ANDREWS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Blake Andrews appealed a trial court's partial grant of his Rule 3.800(a) motion for additional jail and prison credit. The appellate court reversed in part, finding Andrews was entitled to prison credit that the trial court failed to award and to 306 days of jail credit rather than the 198 days awarded.
Andrews is entitled to prison credit for time served on the incarcerative portion of his split sentence. The trial court must award 306 days of jail credit rather than 198 days based on the dates Andrews was incarcerated.
[1] A claim for prior prison time served on cases for which a defendant violated probation is cognizable in a motion for additional jail credit.
[2] Upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence, a defendant is entitled to credit for time served on the incarcerative portion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence, the defendant is entitled to credit for time served on the incarcerative portion.”
Establishes the legal principle that Andrews is entitled to prison credit for time served on the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAndrews was originally sentenced to concurrent terms of prison followed by community control and probation in two cases. He subsequently violated prob…
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CASANUEVA, Judge.
Blake Andrews appeals the trial court’s order which granted in part and denied in part his motion for additional jail credit filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse because the record attachments show that Andrews is entitled to prison credit and additional jail credit. Andrews was originally sentenced to concurrent terms of prison followed by community control and then probation in case numbers 98-1974 and 98-2865. He subsequently admitted to violating the probation in these cases and was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years’ imprisonment.
In his motion, Andrews claimed that he was entitled to credit for prior prison time served on these two cases. This claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. Layman v. State, 787 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). “Upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence, the defendant is entitled to credit for time served on the incarcerative portion.” Id. Here, the trial court did not award prison credit because the boxes labeled “prison credit” on the attached judgments and sentences were left blank. It is the trial court’s responsibility to place a check in the appropriate box concerning prison credit. Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to check the boxes concerning prison credit. See id.
Andrews further claimed that he was entitled to additional jail credit in case number 98-2865. The trial court granted his motion in part and increased Andrews’ jail credit on this case from 175 days to a total of 198 days’ credit. The attachments to the trial court’s order, however,' show that Andrews was in jail on this case from March 2, 1998, to July 13, 1998; from August 24, 1999, to October 27, 1999; and from January 81, 2000, to May 19, 2000. By our calculations, these dates entitle Andrews to 306 days, not 198 days. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an order that awards Andrews 306 days’ jail credit on this case.
As to Andrews’ claims seeking additional jail credit for time served between sentencing and his commitment to the Department of Corrections, we affirm without prejudice to Andrews’ right to pursue his administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections. See Beckwith v. State, 799 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
We affirm Andrews’ remaining claims without comment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
WHATLEY, and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
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Newman v. State, 866 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…in the circuit court. However, in Rood, unlike in the instant case, there was no claim that the trial court failed to award prison credit. The Rood complaint was that the Department of Corrections failed to credit the prison time. Andrews v. State, 822 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), dealt with almost identical circumstances, including the denial of a 3.800(a) motion. Andrews alleged that the trial court failed to award prison credit because the boxes labeled “prison credit” on the sentences were left blank.…
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Gerald v. State, 879 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…awarded prison credit, and the calculation of the time previously served in the Department of Corrections is left to the Department to compute. See § 921.0017, Fla. Stat. (1997); Newman v. State, 866 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Andrews v. State, 822 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We therefore reverse the order now before us and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. The defendant need not be present. Reversed and remanded. . Miami-Dade County Circuit Court case number 98-33400.…
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Barnes v. State, 868 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…ctions to correct the appellant’s sentence to reflect the 945 days actually served, in addition to the time credited to appellant in the trial court’s order granting motion to correct illegal sentence. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a); Andrews v. State, 822 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We affirm all other aspects of the trial court’s order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded with instructions.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shamus D. Layman v. State, 787 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Cummings v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Beckwith v. State, 799 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)