WILLIAM C. BARKER AND PHYLLIS BARKER, APPELLANTS,
v.
GREENSTREET FINANCIAL L.P. ETC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2002-07-17
Nos. 3D01-3461, 3D01-2832
Before GREEN and SHEVIN, JJ., and NESBITT, Senior Judge.
823 So. 2d 195 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

William and Phyllis Barker appealed a default judgment entered against them in a loan dispute, arguing that service by certified mail did not comply with Florida statutory and procedural requirements and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction. The court affirmed, holding that the Barkers' contractual consent to jurisdiction and service by mail in their loan agreement was enforceable and constitutional.


Holding

The court held that the Barkers' contractual agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of Miami-Dade County courts and to accept service by mail was enforceable and valid, conferring personal jurisdiction over them despite improper personal service. Service by certified mail to their last known address, as authorized in the loan documents, was proper under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b).


Headnotes

[1] Parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court.

[2] A contractual provision allowing for service of process by mail to a specified address is enforceable when the parties have agreed to such terms.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“it is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court”

Establishes the fundamental principle that contractual jurisdiction clauses are enforceable

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The Barkers borrowed money from Greenstreet Financial L.P. and signed loan documents containing a clause in which they irrevocably consented to the no…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
NESBITT, Senior Judge.

NESBITT, Senior Judge.

Borrowers William and Phyllis Barker appeal from the final judgment and underlying interlocutory order granting a default against them, in which the court determined it had in personam jurisdiction over them. To procure the order granting a default, lender Greenstreet Financial L.P., filed and served a written motion upon the Barkers advising them of the anticipated hearing on the matter. At that hearing, the court granted Greenstreet’s motion, finding that the Barkers had evad ed service of the amended complaint. Thereafter, the court entered final judgment which was not further opposed, and the Barkers effected both an interlocutory-appeal as well as an appeal from the final judgment.

The Barkers’ claim here is that the service by mail, certified mad return receipt requested, did not comport with the requirements of section 48.031, Florida Statutes (2000) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070. Therefore, they maintain, they had never been properly served and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the rulings under appeal. We disagree, and affirm both the' order and the judgment.

In the loan documents forming the basis of the instant dispute, each of the Barkers agreed as follows:

8. CONSENT TO JURISDICTION. THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY IRREVOCABLY SUBMITS TO THE NONEXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF ANY UNITED STATES FEDERAL OR STATE COURT SITTING IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, IN ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS GUARANTEE, AND THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY IRREVOCABLY AGREE(S) THAT ALL CLAIMS IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTION OR PROCEEDING MAY BE HEARD AND DETERMINED IN ANY SUCH UNITED STATES FEDERAL OR STATE COURT. SERVICE OF COPIES OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AND. ANY OTHER PROCESS WHICH MAY BE SERVED IN ANY SUCH ACTION OR PROCEEDING MAY BE MADE BY MAILING OR DELIVERING A COPY OF SUCH PROCESS TO THE UNDERSIGNED at his last known address.

In National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964), the Court considered a case arising in diversity where Michigan residents leased farm equipment from a New York-based company. The contract contained choice of forum and choice of law clauses, both in favor of New York. The lessees did not read this provision. The Court held the clause enforceable because “it is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court....” Id. at 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411. We find that National Equipment is directly applicable to the instant case and confirms the trial court’s decision that the Barkers could agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of the Miami court and be bound by that promise.* See First National Bank v. Ibarra, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 660, 716 N.E. 2nd 647, 649 (1999)(upholding service by mail upon guarantor at address as specified in contract). See also Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Insurance Assoc., 48 F.R.D. 15, 26 (E.D.Tenn.1969)(A party may waive or be estopped from asserting an objection to service of process by reason of a stipulation in a contract.)

We note that nothing in either the statute or the rule prohibits the procedure here employed, nor can we see how such an arrangement violates constitutional concepts of due process, the common law, or common sense. A contract which precludes the introduction of certain evidence is a good example of an analogous contractual undertaking. Here, Greenstreet’s motion for a default recited that attempts to personally serve the Barkers had failed, which prompted the mailing of service to the Barkers as agreed upon. In granting the default, the court found the Barkers had evaded personal service. Thus, the order of default was properly entered pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b).

Affirmed.

*

Because we find the Barkers were amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the court, the entry of final judgment prior to the disposition of the interlocutory appeal did not divest this court of jurisdiction to effectuate its mandate.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Anthony v. Gary J. Rotella & Assocs., P.A., 906 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …rize his attorney to accept the initial pleadings without service of process. Id.; see Hervis v. Valdez, 381 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Third, a defending party can agree to accept service of process by mail. Id.; see Barker v. Greenstreet Fin., 823 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002). In Caban v. Skinner, service was made on an employee at the defendant’s residence. 648 So. 2d 251, 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). The third district held that service of process in such a manner was invalid and the trial court should…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw