RAYMOND J. SCHUTTE, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Trial court lacked authority to amend a probation order three years after sentencing by adding sex offender conditions that should have been imposed at the original sentencing, as modifications must occur within 60 days under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c).
A trial court may not modify a probation order sua sponte more than 60 days after the original sentencing to add statutorily mandated sex offender conditions.
[1] An incomplete sentence that fails to include statutorily mandated conditions is not illegal and must be corrected within 60 days under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSchutte was sentenced to probation with an initial probation order. Nearly three years later, the trial court entered an amended judgment adding statu…
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PER CURIAM.
Under appeal in the present case is an instrument entitled “Amended Judgment, Sentence and Order Placing Defendant on Probation During Portion of Sentence.” The parties agree that the trial court entered this order pursuant to its own motion almost three years after the initial probation order. The amended probation order purported to add certain statutorily mandated conditions for sex offenders. At the time of the original sentencing, the trial court did not orally pronounce, or make reference to, the statutorily mandated sex offender conditions.
We follow the pronouncement of the Fifth District, which was faced with an identical situation in Kiriazes v. State, 798 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In that case, the Fifth District determined that the original sentence “was incomplete as opposed to illegal under the definition in Carter [v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001) ].” Because the sentence in Kiriazes was not illegal, the trial court was required to make any modification within 60 days. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(c). The same logic would apply to the present case, and, accordingly, the trial court’s sua sponte modification of the probation order some three years after the original order may not stand. The amended probation order is REVERSED.
KAHN, WEBSTER, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Beal v. State, 978 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…n it modified appellant’s probation to include electronic monitoring where the modification occurred more than 60 days after the original sentence was rendered in violation of rule 3.800(c), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Schutte v. State, 824 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The amended order is reversed and the added condition is stricken. WOLF and BENTON, JJ., CONCUR; PADOVANO, J., concurs in result with opinion.…1 / 2
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Harris v. State, 879 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…on active probation while committed to the care and custody of DCFS, the terms of his probation have been improperly enhanced from nonresidential to residential sex-offender treatment without a violation of probation. Id. See also Schutte v. State, 824 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing amended probation order entered more than 60 days after the initial probation order, because the amended order imposed additional statutorily mandated conditions for sex offenders). We deny the motions for rehearing a…
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Sameh Salib Soliman v. State, 241 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…s v. State, 798 So. 2d 789, 792-94 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), which held that the failure to impose mandatory standard conditions of sex offender probation results in an "incomplete" sentence correctable under rule 3.800(c). See also Schutte v. State, 824 So. 2d 308, 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (following Kiriazes). But see Beal v. State, 978 So. 2d 825, 825-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (Padovano, J., concurring in result) (explaining why failing to impose statutorily mandated condition of probation should instead be…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- Williams v. State, 798 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Kiriazes v. State, 798 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)