DANIEL ZUCHEL, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 4th DCA | 2002-09-04
No. 4D02-2579
STEVENSON, GROSS and MAY, JJ„ concur.
824 So. 2d 1044 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 36 cases

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Synopsis

Daniel Zuchel petitioned for a writ of prohibition after a trial judge denied his motion to disqualify. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the petition, finding that the judge's refusal to allow cross-examination of a key witness at a bond hearing sufficiently alleged judicial bias under Florida law.


Holding

The motion to disqualify was legally sufficient. The outright denial of the fundamental right to cross-examine a witness at a bail proceeding would give a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of judicial bias and lack of impartiality.


Headnotes

[1] Allegations in a motion to disqualify a judge are reviewed de novo to determine legal sufficiency.

[2] A motion to disqualify a judge must demonstrate that the party fears an unfair trial due to specifically described prejudice or bias.

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Key Quotes

“Whether the motion is legally sufficient requires a determination as to whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.”

Establishes the standard for evaluating motions to disqualify judges.

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Facts & Procedural History

Zuchel was charged with aggravated stalking and violation of a restraining order. The trial judge initially set bond at $150,000, then reduced it to $…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Daniel Zuchel, has filed a petition for writ of prohibition following the denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge. We grant the petition.

Zuchel is charged with aggravated stalking and violation of a restraining order. The trial judge initially set bond at $150,000. Zuchel later filed a motion to reduce bond, which the trial court partially granted, reducing bond to $100,000. In his motion to disqualify, Zuchel alleged that at the bond reduction hearing, the trial judge refused to allow his counsel to cross-examine the key witness and that he feared he would not receive a fair trial because the judge “is not interested in hearing my side of the case.” Allegations in a motion to disqualify are reviewed under a de novo standard as to whether the motion is legally sufficient as a matter of law. See § 38.10, Fla. Stat.; Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958, 121 S.Ct. 1487, 149 L.Ed.2d 374 (2001). A motion to disqualify is governed in substance by section 38.10, Florida Statutes, and procedurally by rule 2.160, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The rule states that “[a] motion to disqualify shall show ... that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1).

Whether the motion is legally sufficient requires a determination as to whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.1990).

The term “legal sufficiency” encompasses more than mere technical compliance with the rule and the statute; the court must also determine if the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial.

Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We find that petitioner met his burden in this case. Zuchel alleged that he feared bias and prejudice by the trial judge because at the bond hearing the judge would not allow his lawyer to cross-examine the victim in the pending “stalking” and “violation of restraining order” charges. The victim’s testimony was used by the State, however, in its opposition to the motion to reduce bond.

We disagree with the State’s contention that petitioner has only alleged his dissatisfaction with an adverse judicial ruling, which generally is not a sufficient legal ground for judicial disqualification. See Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1097, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996). Here, the challenge is not so much to the propriety of the judge’s' evidentiary ruling; rather, Zuchel asserts that the judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim indicates his unwillingness to hear Zuchel’s side of the case. We agree that Zuchel’s allegation that the outright denial of the basic and fundamental right of cross-examination, see Medina v. Sandstrom, 384 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(holding that the right to cross-examination is fundamental in a bail proceeding), would give a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of judicial bias.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and remand for the assignment of a new trial judge.

STEVENSON, GROSS and MAY, JJ„ concur.


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Citator

Cited By (18 total)

  • Flavio Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …ther a motion to disqualify is “legally sufficient” is whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983); Zuchel v. State, 824 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); see also Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (providing that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impart…
  • Peterson v. Asklipious, 833 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …fore him. As well, the trial judge is alleged to have been unwilling to afford petitioner the opportunity to be heard on his ability to pay the attorney’s fees previously ordered, a due process right in the contempt proceedings. See Zuchel v. State, 824 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted. Any orders entered after the filing of the motion for disqualification shall be vacated. POLEN, C.J., FARMER an…
  • Ardis v. Ardis, 130 So. 3d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …l judge is legally suffi-dent requires a determination as to whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(d)(1); Zuchel v. State, 824 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In determining the legal sufficiency of such a motion, the court must also determine if the facts alleged, which must be taken as true, would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he or she could not receive a fa…

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