JACK GORDON AND DONALD STONEBURNER, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1929-05-13
Whitfield, P. J., and Strum, J., concur., Terrell, C. J., and Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
97 Fla. 806 Florida Supreme Court (1929) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a conviction where defendants were found guilty on general verdict for both larceny and receiving stolen property, finding the verdict legally inconsistent.

Holding

No, a judgment of conviction cannot stand on a general verdict of guilty under these circumstances because the verdict is legally inconsistent.

Key Quotes

“Where an accused is charged in one count of an information with the larceny of an automobile, and in another count with receiving the same automobile as stolen property knowing it to be stolen, only one larceny of the automobile being involved, a verdict which in effect finds the accused guilty both as a principal in the larceny and as receiver of the same goods is inconsistent in law, and no judgment can be entered thereon.”

This quote establishes the legal precedent for why a general verdict of guilty on counts of both larceny and receiving stolen property is invalid.
Facts & Procedural History

Defendants were charged in separate counts for larceny of a boat and for receiving and concealing the same boat. A general verdict of guilty was retur…

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Topics
Inconsistent Verdicts Receiving Stolen Property Larceny

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Opinion of the Court
Buford, J.

Buford, J.

The defendants were charged by information in two counts. The first count charged them jointly with the crime of larceny of a certain boat by name of “Calobar.” The second count charged them jointly with the crime of receiving and aiding in the concealment of the same boat. Both offenses were charged to have been committed on the same day. There was a general-verdict of guilty. Motion for new trial was made and denied. Judgment of conviction and sentence was entered and writ of error sued out.

The first question raised by the assignments of error is whether or not a judgment of conviction may stand upon a general verdict of guilty under an information charging the two offenses in separate counts as was charged in this case. This question is definitely answered in this jurisdiction by the language of the opinion in the case of Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. R. 12, in which the Court say:

Where an accused is charged in one count of an information with the larceny of an automobile, and in another count with receiving the same automobile as stolen property knowing it to be stolen, only one larceny of the automobile being involved, a verdict which in effect finds the accused guilty both as a principal in the larceny and as receiver of the same goods is inconsistent in law, and no judgment can be entered thereon.

The judgment must be reversed and it is so ordered.

Reversed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Strum, J., concur. Terrell, C. J., and Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Goodwin v. State, 157 Fla. 751 (Fla. 1946)
    …d by the thieves which yielded a quantity of cash which was divided with one of the appellants, the other (Lukers) failed to get his cut. Appellants rely to a great extent on Bergesser v. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. 12, and Gordon et al., v. State, 97 Fla. 806, 122 So. 218, for reversal. These cases are not controlling. In the first place the factual background is so different that we shall not consume the necessary space to differentiate between them. In the second place, since those cases were decided t…
  • Barton v. State, 507 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
    …esolution of the present case. Initially, it was held in Florida that verdicts on different counts where the finding on one necessarily includes a finding that an essential element in the other does not exist must be set aside. See Gordon v. State, 97 Fla. 806, 122 So. 218 (1929); Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. 12 (1928). The rule relating to inconsistency as between multiple guilty verdicts is set forth in 18 A.L.R.3d 259 at 283: The general rule dispensing with the necessity for consistency a…
  • Allison v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 700 (Fla. 1947)
    …are separate and distinct offenses and where the same property, the same larceny and the same person as principal are involved, then the counts are inconsistent and the verdict and judgment are invalid. The case of Gordon and Stoneburner v. State, 97 Fla. 806, 122 So. 218, involved inconsistent counts in the same information. The first count charged them jointly with the larceny of the boat “Colobar,” and the second count charged them jointly with the crime of receiving and aiding in the concealment of t…

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