IN THE INTEREST OF P.S., A CHILD. F.S.G., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2002-09-13
No. 2D01-4524
BLUE, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.
825 So. 2d 530 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

Father F.S.G. appealed the trial court's adjudication of his child P.S. as dependent based on his prior DUI arrest from 1993. The appellate court reversed, holding that the prior DUI was inadmissible, irrelevant, and that the evidence failed to establish the child was at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect.


Holding

The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior DUI evidence as it was not relevant to any material fact at issue. The evidence in the record did not support a finding that the child was at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect, and therefore the adjudication of dependency was improper.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of a prior DUI arrest, occurring six years before dependency proceedings and before the child's birth, is not relevant to any material fact in issue in those pro…

[2] A child may be found dependent if the court finds the child to be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodi…

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Key Quotes

“the evidence here of the father's previous DUI arrest, which occurred six years before the instant proceedings and long before P.S. was born, was not, by itself, relevant to any material fact in issue”

Establishes that the prior DUI evidence was inadmissible and irrelevant to the dependency determination

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Facts & Procedural History

F.S.G. is the father of minor child P.S. The trial court admitted evidence of the father's DUI arrest from 1993, which occurred six years before the d…

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Opinion of the Court
DAVIS, Judge.

DAVIS, Judge.

F.S.G., the father of the minor child, P.S., challenges the trial court’s order adjudicating the child dependent. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting proof of a prior 1993 DUI incident and in declaring this child dependent. Because the record does not demonstrate that the child was at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect as a result of the father’s actions, we reverse. See § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999).

We observe first that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the father’s prior DUI arrest and in considering that incident in reaching its determination of dependency. Although similar fact evidence of such prior conduct may be admissible to prove a material fact that is at issue,1 the evidence here of the father’s previous DUI arrest, which occurred six years before the instant proceedings and long before P.S. was born, was not, by itself, relevant to any material fact in issue. See Foburg v. State, 744 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Next, although the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it found the child dependent, only two of the six possible statutory grounds could apply factually. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f). Having determined that the child was not abandoned, abused, or neglected pursuant to section 39.01(14)(a), as those terms have been statutorily defined, we conclude that the only basis for the court’s adjudication of dependency must be section 39.01(14)(f). See §§ 39.01(14)(a); 39.01(1); 39.01(2); 39.01(30); 39.01(46).

Under section 39.01(14)(f), a child may be found dependent if the court finds the child to be “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.” The facts contained in the record on appeal do not support such a finding here. “The issue in prospective neglect or abuse cases is whether future behavior will adversely affect the child and can be clearly and certainly predicted.” Palmer v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Based on the evidence below, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the father’s single act “clearly and certainly” predicted future neglect.

Reversed.

BLUE, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur. . See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).


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Citator

Cited By

  • J.F. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 890 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
    …2000). The issue in these types of cases is whether future behavior, which will adversely affect the child, can be “clearly and certainly predicted.” L.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); accord In re P.S., 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Or, stated another way, whether it is “likely to happen” or “expected.” In re J.L., 824 So. 2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citations omitted). On appeal, the Department argues that, as to subsection (h), no nexus need be show…
  • …Family Servs. (In re T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Thus, the issue is whether “future behavior will adversely affect the child and can be clearly and certainly predicted.” F.S.G. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re P.S.), 825 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Put another way, the court must determine whether the prospective abuse is “likely to happen” or “expected.” J.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re J.L.), 824 So. 2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Moreover, courts…
  • J.C. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 937 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
    …abuse is not imminent within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in all imminency eases the issue is whether “future behavior will adversely affect the child and can be clearly and certainly predicted.” In re P.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 825 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Palmer v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); see also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E. 2d 840, 845 (2004)(“Imminent danger ... must be near or impending,…

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