NICHOLAS ACOSTA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2002-09-18
No. 4D01-2350
FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
825 So. 2d 1076 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Nicholas Acosta was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation at an auto repair shop where he allegedly smashed a customer's windshield. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court admitted inadmissible hearsay testimony from a police officer regarding statements from witnesses who did not testify, violating the Confrontation Clause and evidentiary rules.


Holding

The court held that the admission of the officer's hearsay testimony regarding statements from untestifying witnesses was clearly inadmissible, highly prejudicial, and not harmless error. The conviction must be reversed because this testimony improperly bolstered the state's case by suggesting nine independent witnesses supported the victim's version when only one such witness actually testified.


Headnotes

[1] An investigating officer's testimony that other witnesses, not called to testify, confirmed the state's version of the facts constitutes inadmissible hearsay.

[2] Allowing an investigating officer to testify that multiple unnamed witnesses confirmed the victim's version of events, when those witnesses do not testify, is highly prej…

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Key Quotes

“This testimony was, as appellant's counsel made clear in his objection, classic hearsay testimony.”

The court identified the officer's testimony regarding statements from non-testifying witnesses as inadmissible hearsay.

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Facts & Procedural History

Acosta managed an auto repair shop where he became involved in an altercation with a customer over repair charges. According to the customer, Acosta s…

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Opinion of the Court
KLEIN, J.

KLEIN, J.

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a result of an altercation with a customer at the auto repair shop which appellant managed. According to the customer, the argument over the repair charges culminated in appellant smashing the victim’s windshield with a metal object, showering glass on the victim who was behind the wheel.

The police officer who arrived on the scene was uncertain, from what he had been told, whether it was the appellant or the victim who should be arrested, but a number of witnesses confirmed the victim’s version of events.

At trial the state presented the testimony of only one independent eye witness, another customer, who testified that appellant had smashed the windshield when it appeared that the victim was attempting to drive his vehicle away without paying. Over appellant’s objection, the officer testified that he had spoken with a number of other people at the scene who were not willing to give written statements and that they had confirmed the victim’s version of what had happened. The officer was further allowed to testify that after speaking with about nine people, he had determined that a crime had been committed and informed appellant that he was charged with aggravated assault. In closing argument the prosecutor pointed out that the officer had spoken to at least nine other witnesses who all confirmed the victim’s testimony.

This testimony was, as appellant’s counsel made clear in his objection, classic hearsay testimony. § 90.801(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). In Szuba v. State, 749 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) the court reversed where precisely the same type of testimony was permitted, an investigating officer testifying that other witnesses to the crime, who did not testify at trial, confirmed the state’s version of the facts.

It was not only clearly inadmissible, which the state now recognizes, but highly prejudicial. It was as if the state had presented nine independent eye witnesses to support the victim’s version of this dispute, when in fact it only produced one independent eye witness. We cannot, accordingly, agree with the only argument advanced by the state, which is that the error was harmless. Reversed.

FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Clarke v. State, 976 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
    …ot repeated, references to the statement are inadmissible if the ‘inescapable inference ... is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the police with evidence of the defendant’s guilt.’ ” (quoting Schaffer, 769 So. 2d at 499)); Acosta v. State, 825 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (officer’s testimony that non-testifying eyewitnesses he interviewed confirmed victim’s version of events was inadmissible hearsay). We also conclude that the error was preserved. The record reveals that, although the tria…

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