DAMIEN HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Harris sought post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay at a suppression hearing and failing to seek suppression of an un-Mirandized confession. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the hearsay claim but reversed and remanded the Miranda-related claims for reconsideration, finding the trial court erred by failing to address Harris's supplemental motion on the merits.
The court affirmed denial of the hearsay objection claim because hearsay is admissible in suppression hearings. The court reversed the denial of the Miranda-related claims as facially sufficient and not conclusively refuted by the record, and remanded for reconsideration. The court reversed the trial court's failure to address the supplement on its merits, holding the trial court must rule on supplements filed within the two-year period.
[1] Hearsay testimony is admissible in a suppression hearing.
[2] A claim that a confession was obtained without Miranda warnings, and that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression, is facially sufficient if not conclusiv…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“because hearsay testimony is admissible in a suppression hearing, the denial of this claim is affirmed”
Establishes the legal standard that hearsay may be admitted in suppression hearings, so counsel's failure to object cannot constitute ineffective assistance on that basis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarris filed a Rule 3.850 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his trial counsel failed to object to hearsay testimony at a s…
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BLUE, Chief Judge.
Damien Harris filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion which was summarily denied by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the trial court for further consideration.
Harris’s first claim was that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony at a suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that although hearsay testimony occurred in the suppression hearing, the admission of it could not have affected the outcome of the trial. We disagree with the reason for the ruling. However, because hearsay testimony is admissible in a suppression hearing, the denial of this claim is affirmed. See Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.1985).
Harris’s second issue was that he was questioned and confessed without having had the benefit of being advised of his Miranda
rights, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of his confession. The trial court stated that this issue was raised and argued in the suppression hearing and should have been raised on appeal. Harris claimed in his motion that this issue was raised on appeal but was not addressed on its merits because of counsel’s failure to preserve the error. This is a facially sufficient claim that is not conclusively refuted by the attachments to the trial court’s order. The order of the trial court is reversed as to this issue and remanded for reconsideration.
Harris filed a supplement to his rule 3.850 motion prior to the trial court’s ruling on the original motion and within the two-year time limit set out in the rule. The trial court did not address this supplement in its order. The failure to rule on the merits of the supplement is error in light of Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1999). In Gaskin, the supreme court stated that when an amendment to a rule 3.850 motion is filed within the two-year time limit, the trial court should rule on the merits of the claims presented in the amendment. Id. at 517.2
In the supplement to the motion Harris claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission at trial of his confession and evidence obtained as a result of the police interrogation, thereby not preserving the issue for appeal. Harris stated in the supplement that the issue was raised on appeal but was not addressed on its merits because of counsel’s failure to preserve the error. This is a facially sufficient claim, and the trial court is directed to consider the claim on its merits. As with all facially sufficient claims presented in rule 3.850 motions, if the trial court determines that the claim is conclusively refuted by the record, it must attach to its order denying relief those portions of the record that support its conclusion. Otherwise, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of the claim.
Harris also filed a motion for rehearing in which he argued that the trial court erred in not considering his supplement. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing with no explanation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SILBERMAN and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur. . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. It would appear that this case may implicitly overrule, at least in part, McConn v. State, 708 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (en banc).
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Nedor Hyacinthe v. State, 940 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…any time within the two-year time limit as long as the trial court has not yet ruled on the merits of the motion. Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1999), receded from on other grounds, Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579 (Fla.2004); Harris v. State, 826 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Hyacinthe’s motion was not successive because the prior motions were not determined on the merits. See also Mancebo v. State, 931 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). We reverse the summary denial of the motion for post-conviction rel…
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McABEE v. State, 873 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…enying original motion in part had been entered, where court had not entered final order disposing of original motion); Beard v. State, 827 So. 2d 1021, 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Lang v. State, 826 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Harris v. State, 826 So. 2d 340, 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding failure to rule on merits of supplement was error). Accordingly, we affirm without further discussion the denial of the original motion for postconviction relief but remand for the trial court to consider the two add…
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Ruiz v. State, 108 So. 3d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…l. 645 So. 2d at 968. It is well established that an affir-mance of a direct appeal on an unpre-served issue does not bar a defendant from seeking postconviction review under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 826 So. 2d 340, 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Scholtes v. State, 27 So. 3d 175, 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Accordingly, the postconviction court erred in denying this motion summarily. We note that the issue on remand is not whether Mr. Ruiz would have received a new tri…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1999)
- Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1985)
- McCONN v. State, 708 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)