RODERICK NORMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Roderick Norman appealed his cocaine sale conviction, arguing he was entitled to a jury instruction requiring the state to prove he knew the substance was cocaine. The court reversed, holding that a post-offense statute attempting to eliminate the knowledge element violated the Florida Constitution's prohibition on retroactive application of criminal statutes.
The court held that Norman was entitled to the jury instruction as required by McMillon v. State, and that the post-offense statute cannot be applied retroactively to his conviction because Article X, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution prohibits retroactive application of criminal statutes.
[1] A statute enacted after the commission of a crime cannot be applied retroactively to affect prosecution or punishment for that crime, consistent with constitutional prohi…
[2] Failure to instruct a jury on an essential element of a charged offense constitutes harmful error, particularly when the omission is brought to the trial court's attentio…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Repeal or amendment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed.”
Florida Constitution Article X, Section 9, which the court held prohibits retroactive application of the statute to Norman's pre-offense conviction
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoderick Norman was convicted of sale or delivery of cocaine. Norman requested a jury instruction requiring the jury to find that he knew the substanc…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Knowledge Of Illicit Nature Of Substance cases and more on FLexlaw
BENTON, J.
Roderick Norman appeals his conviction for sale or delivery of cocaine, contending that he was entitled to a jury instruction the trial court refused to give, which would have required the jury to find, in order to convict, that he knew that the substance that changed hands1 was cocaine. The state argues that a statute enacted after the offense allegedly occurred,2 governs the outcome of the appeal, and precludes reversal otherwise con- cededly required by our supreme court’s recent decision in McMillon v. State, 813 So. 2d 56 (Fla.2002). We reject this contention as repugnant to article X, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits retroactive application of statutes in criminal proceedings in these words: “Repeal or amendment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed.” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial before a jury instructed in the manner the supreme court required in McMillon v. State, 813 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla.2002).
. There was no evidence that the appellant ever had physical custody of the cocaine it was alleged he sold or delivered. But this circumstance is not controlling. See McMil-lon v. State, 813 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla.2002) (holding "the trial court's failure to grant McMillon's request for the specific jury instruction harmful error" despite his "actual possession"); Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 170-71 (Fla.2002) ("Since the jury is entitled to be instructed on the elements of the offense, it cannot be harmless error to fail to do so especially when the omission is brought to the attention of the trial court by the defendant.”).
. Creating Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, Chapter 2002 258, section 1, Laws of Florida, provides:
893.707. Legislative findings and intent.—
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC94701 [808 So. 2d 166] (Fla.2002) and Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1996), holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.
(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter. (3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
Garcia v. State, 854 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…drug offenses, but lack of such knowledge is an affirmative defense. § 893.101(1). These statutory provisions are, however, not applicable to this case since they became law after the alleged commission of the offense by Garcia. See Norman v. State, 826 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that application of section 893.101 to offense occurring before enactment of statute would be “repugnant to article X, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits retroactive application of statutes in c…
-
Taylor v. State, 13 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…controlled substance as an element of the offense the State is required to prove, and designating the lack of such knowledge as an affirmative defense to the offenses in the chapter); Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla.1983); Norman v. State, 826 So. 2d 440, 440-41 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Appellant, who was the driver, jointly possessed the premises, i.e., the interior of the vehicle, with the owner/passenger. If the site where the contraband is found is in joint, rather than exclusive, possession,…
-
Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…. The parties have not cited, nor has research unearthed, any Florida cases examining the facial constitutionality of the statute here challenged. The one case that dealt with any constitutional ramifications from this statute was Norman v. State, 826 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), holding that retroactive application of 893.101 was unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution.…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996)
- Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002)
- McMILLON v. State, 813 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2002)