HAROLD WOLFGANG LANGNER, APPELLANT,
v.
TIMOTHY H. COX, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court vacated firearm-related provisions of repeat violence injunction because they were imposed without affording the defendant due process to contest their necessity.
Firearm prohibitions in a repeat violence injunction are discretionary, not mandatory, and cannot be imposed without the defendant receiving notice and an opportunity to present evidence regarding their necessity.
[1] Firearm and ammunition prohibitions in an injunction for protection against repeat violence are discretionary rather than mandatory and require the defendant to receive n…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Such provisions are not mandatory when an injunction for protection against repeat violence is entered. Rather, they may be included if the trial court concludes that they are necessary to protect the petitioner.”
Court explaining the discretionary nature of firearm prohibitions under § 784.046(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001)
Appellant Langner was subject to a final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence that prohibited him from using or possessing fi…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of a final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence which, among other things, prohibited him from using or possessing firearms or ammunition and ordered him to surrender any firearms or ammunition in his possession to the sheriff. As appellant correctly notes, he did not consent to the entry of a final judgment incorporating such provisions, and he was not afforded an opportunity to present evidence regarding whether such provisions were necessary. Such provisions are not mandatory when an injunction for protection against repeat violence is entered. Rather, they may be included if the trial court concludes that they are necessary to protect the petitioner. See § 784.046(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Because they were entered without due process of law, we vacate those portions of the final judgment which prohibit appellant from using or possessing firearms or ammunition and order him to surrender any firearms or ammunition in his possession to the sheriff, and remand for a hearing at which appellant may present such evidence as he deems appropriate regarding the necessity of incorporating such provisions into the final judgment. In all other respects, the final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
MINER, KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ„ concur.
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Dean v. Jaclyn Diane Bevis (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…der of the respondent's firearms. We already use such a procedure in cases involving a final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating violence pursuant to section 784.046. See, e.g., Langner v. Cox, 826 So. 2d 475, 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("Such provisions are not mandatory [but] may be included if the trial court concludes that they are necessary to protect the petitioner. See § 784.046(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Because they were entered without due proces…