CORA STOKES, AS GUARDIAN OF G. L. STOKES, INSANE, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER J. WHIDDEN, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1929-05-31
Strum and Buford, J. J., concur., Terrell, C. J., and Ellis, J., concur in the opinion and judgment., Brown, J., dissents.
97 Fla. 1057 Florida Supreme Court (1929) Caution
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

This case concerns a guardian's attempt to sell a homestead property of an insane ward. The court held that the guardian could not unilaterally convey the homestead, as it requires the joint consent of both spouses.


Holding

No, the wife, as guardian, could not unilaterally convey the homestead. The Constitution requires the joint consent of both husband and wife for the alienation of a homestead.


Key Quotes

“The homestead having been acquired by the husband and occupied as a home by him and his family, the mere facts that the husband, was afterward adjudged to be insane and was committed to and remains in a State institution and the wife was appointed as his guardian, did not authorize the guardian to convey the' title to the home [*1059] stead real estate”

Establishes that the husband's insanity and wife's guardianship did not grant her authority to sell the homestead.

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Facts & Procedural History

A husband acquired and lived on a property as his homestead. He was later adjudged insane and committed to a state hospital. His wife, appointed as hi…

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Opinion of the Court
Whitfield, P. J.

Whitfield, P. J.

In proceedings brought by the guardian of an insane person to enforce the payment of a purchase money mortgage, it appears that the insane person acquired and with his family lived on the locus in quo as his homestead. Subsequently he was adjudged insane and committed to the State Hospital for the insane. His wife was appointed his guardian and as such guardian undertook to sell and convey the homestead property, taking a purchase money mortgage which she sought to foreclose. By answer averring failure to consideration the homestead character of the property is shown and the ineffectiveness of the sale and conveyance is averred. The court as on cross bill decreed that the deed of conveyance and the purchase money notes and mortgage be canceled and surrendered and that the guardian repay with interest the part of the purchase money received by her. The guardian appealed and claims that she has properly and legally conveyed title to the homestead.

The homestead having been acquired by the husband and occupied as a home by him and his family, the mere facts that the husband, was afterward adjudged to be insane and was committed to and remains in a State institution and the wife was appointed as his guardian, did not authorize the guardian to convey the' title to the home stead real estate which under, the Constitution “shall not be alienable without the joint consent of husband and wife, when that relation exists,” and which alienation must be “by deed or mortgage duly executed by * * * husband and wife, if such relation exists.” Secs. 1, 4, Art. X, Constitution.

Whether under such circumstances a court of equity may in appropriate proceedings authorize a guardian or other person to act for the insane husband and join with the wife in making a conveyance that would pass the title to the homestead, need not be considered here as no such case is presented by the record.

Affirmed.

Strum and Buford, J. J., concur. Terrell, C. J., and Ellis, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.

Brown, J., dissents.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Crain v. Putnam, 687 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …nd had spent the “latter years” of his life away from the homestead, so that he could be cared for in a neighbor’s home and his daughter’s home, did not destroy the homestead nature of the property for purposes of devise. See also Stokes v. Whidden, 97 Fla. 1057, 122 So. 566 (Fla.1929) (property was still homestead after husband had become insane and had remained in a state institution). We recognize that the homestead provisions found in Article VII and Article X of our constitution are separate and disti…
  • Dean v. Heimbach, 409 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …ry. Dean’s unrefuted testimony established that he intended to return to the property after his criminal problems were resolved. Such an involuntary absence cannot, by itself, support a finding of abandonment of the homestead. See Stokes v. Whidden, 97 Fla. 1057, 122 So. 566 (1929). To preserve a homestead, the family head is not required to remain on the property, so long as his absence is temporary and he intends to return. See e.g., Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). The homestead will also…
  • Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge v. A to Z Props., Inc., 263 So. 3d 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)

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