DALLAS BROWN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Petitioner's habeas corpus petition seeking reinstatement of a post-conviction appeal was dismissed as successive, abusive of procedure, and untimely under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141.
A successive habeas corpus petition rearguing a previously denied motion to reinstate appeal constitutes an abuse of procedure and is subject to dismissal on timeliness grounds.
[1] A successive habeas corpus petition rearguing a previously denied motion to reinstate appeal constitutes an abuse of appellate procedure and is subject to dismissal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner filed an unauthorized post-conviction motion in 1990, which was denied. His subsequent appeal was dismissed for failure to pay filing fees …
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GRIFFIN, J.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus to obtain reinstatement of his post-conviction appeal which was dismissed by order dated May 29, 1993. On October 27, 1990, petitioner filed a pro se “motion to discharge,” an unauthorized post-conviction motion. The circuit court denied the motion on December 19, 1990. Petitioner appealed the order, and the appeal was dismissed on March 12, 1991 due to petitioner’s failure to obtain an order of insolvency or to pay the required filing fees. Petitioner then filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Florida, which was treated as a petition for writ of mandamus. Subsequently, on January 13, 1993, the supreme court directed this court to reinstate the appeal. On March 29, 1993, this court dismissed the appeal, finding that the notice of appeal was untimely. On April 9, 1993, petitioner filed a pro se motion to reinstate appeal, which was denied on May 4,1993.
The instant petition reargues the motion to reinstate appeal. As such, it is successive and constitutes an abuse of procedure. The petition is also untimely under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141. Effective January 1, 1997, petitioners have two years in which to seek a belated appeal. Petitioner’s two-year period expired on January 1, 1999. See Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(c)(4)(A) and (C). We accordingly dismiss the petition.
DISMISSED.
COBB and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur.
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Ashworth v. State, 41 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…not filed within the two-year time period and does not meet the requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c)(4)(A). Therefore, Ash-worth’s petition is dismissed. See Dickson v. State, 22 So. 3d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Brown v. State, 826 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). While the untimeliness of his petition is dispositive, we note that, additionally, the petition is facially insufficient because it does not comply with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c)(3), including the fact that it…