HOWARD GILLARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Howard Gillard appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging the revocation of his conditional release. The Florida Parole Commission conducted his revocation hearing 77 days after his arrest, exceeding the 45-day statutory requirement. The court affirmed, holding that the 45-day period is not jurisdictional and that Gillard failed to demonstrate prejudice from the delay.
The court held that the 45-day time period in section 947.141(2) is not jurisdictional; therefore, the untimely hearing did not divest the Commission of authority. Although the delay was presumed unreasonable under due process standards, Gillard was not entitled to relief because he failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay.
[1] The 45-day time period for conducting a conditional release revocation hearing under section 947.141(2), Florida Statutes, is not jurisdictional.
[2] A releasee challenging an untimely revocation hearing must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the delay to be entitled to relief.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the time period in section 947.141(2) is not jurisdictional and that the delay was not prejudicial”
States the court's ultimate holding on the central issue
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGillard was sentenced in 1992 to 15 years imprisonment. He was arrested on September 30, 1999, for allegedly violating the terms of his conditional re…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Howard Gillard appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition below, he challenged the revocation of his conditional release by contending that the Florida Parole Commission was without jurisdiction to conduct the revocation hearing beyond the 45-day time period in section 947.141(2), Florida Statutes (1991). Because we determine that the time period in section 947.141(2) is not jurisdictional and that the delay was not prejudicial, we affirm.
Under section 947.1405(6), Florida Statutes (1991), the Commission has jurisdiction over Gillard until December 12, 2007, which is the date his conditional release supervision terminates. The Commission is authorized to establish the length and conditions of the supervision, as long as the length does not exceed the maximum penalty imposed by the sentencing court. In the present case, the appellant was sentenced in 1992 to a term of fifteen years. Although the revocation hearing was conducted on December 16, 1999, which was more than 45 days after his September 30, 1999, arrest, Gillard was still on conditional release supervision at the time of the hearing. See Roach v. Mitchell, 456 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (failure to follow statutory requirement of advising parolee in writing of reasons for extended supervision was not jurisdictional, and therefore the prisoner was on parole at the time of the revocation). Therefore, the untimely hearing did not affect the Commission’s jurisdiction.
Section 947.141(2) is silent as to the consequences of a revocation hearing conducted in violation of the 45-day time period. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[wjithin 45 days after the arrest of a releasee charged with a violation of the terms and conditions of conditional release, the releasee must be afforded a hearing conducted by a commissioner or a duly authorized representative thereof.” Nothing in the statute provides that the failure to timely conduct a conditional release supervision revocation hearing is jurisdictional.
In general, revocation hearings are governed by due process considerations and are subject to the requirement that they be conducted within a reasonable time. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). If the applicable statute sets forth a definite time period for the hearing, and the time period is violated, the delay is presumed unreasonable. See Langle v. State, 559 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Smith v. United, States, 577 F. 2d 1025, 1027 (5th Cir.1978). To be entitled to relief, the releasee must show that he was prejudiced by the alleged delay in addition to showing the statutory violation. See Mattern v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 707 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Taylor v. Dugger, 567 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Therefore, in the present case, the hearing conducted in violation of the 45-day time period would be presumed unreasonable. However, the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay and, accordingly, he is not entitled to relief.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, WOLF and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Shadrick Crump v. State, 137 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…Stat. (2008); Logan v. State, 964 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 5th [*1150] DCA 2007). The Florida Parole Commission oversees the program, and retains jurisdiction over the defendant until his or her conditional release supervision terminates. Gillard v. State, 827 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). During that time, upon violation of any of the terms and conditions of release, the Commission may revoke the conditional release. § 947.141(4), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“[T]he [Commission] panel may revoke conditional release ..…
-
Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 255 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…conduct a revocation hearing within forty-five days must result in his release. "Nothing in [section 947.141] provides that the failure to timely conduct a conditional release supervision revocation hearing is jurisdictional." Gillard v. State, 827 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Moreover, as Gillard explained: [R]evocation hearings are governed by due process considerations and are subject to the requirement that they be conducted within a reasonable time. If the applicable statute sets forth a…
-
Larson v. State, 247 So. 3d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972)
- Smith v. United States, 577 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1978)
- Langle v. State, 559 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Taylor v. Dugger, 567 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Roach v. Anabel Mitchell & Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 456 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Mattern v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 707 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)