TERESA CHUDNOF-JAMES, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
RACETRAC PETROLEUM, INC. AND GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this workers' compensation appeal, the court affirmed the claimant's direct appeal issues but reversed the employer/carrier's cross-appeal challenge regarding an emergency room visit award. The key issue was whether medical opinion testimony from a non-authorized physician should have been admitted, which determined whether competent evidence supported the benefits award.
The court held that the JCC properly excluded Dr. Block's medical opinion testimony because he did not fall into the statutorily authorized categories (expert medical advisor, independent medical examiner, or authorized treating provider). Without Dr. Block's testimony, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the findings of medical necessity or causal relationship between the work injury and the emergency room treatment, and therefore the JCC erred in awarding the medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits.
[1] In workers' compensation cases, only the opinions of expert medical advisors, independent medical examiners, or authorized treating providers are admissible medical opini…
[2] A Judge of Compensation Claims errs in admitting medical opinion testimony from a physician who is not an expert medical advisor, an independent medical examiner, or an a…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1997), governs who can offer medical opinion testimony during workers' compensation hearings. This section limits the medical testimony that is admissible before the JCC to the opinions of (1) expert medical advisors, (2) independent medical examiners, and (3) authorized treating providers.”
Establishes the statutory framework limiting admissible medical testimony in workers' compensation proceedings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTeresa Chudnof-James, a claimant in a workers' compensation case, sought benefits for an emergency room visit in June 2000. Dr. Ernest Block, an emerg…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Medical Necessity cases and more on FLexlaw
WOLF, J.
Both parties appeal the final order in this workers’ compensation case. We affirm both issues raised on direct appeal by the claimant, Teresa Chudnof-James, without further discussion. We must, however, reverse as to the issue raised on cross-appeal by the Employer/Carrier, Racetrac Petroleum Inc.: Whether there was competent substantial evidence to support the award of expenses and benefits associated with the emergency room visit of June 2000.
We must first determine whether the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly excluded the medical opinion testimony of Dr. Ernest Block, an emergency room physician. Section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1997), governs who can offer medical opinion testimony during workers’ compensation hearings. This section limits the medical testimony that is admissible before the JCC to the opinions of (1) expert medical advisors, (2) independent medical examiners, and (3) authorized treating providers.1 The law is clear that a JCC errs in admitting the opinion testimony of a physician who does not fall into one of these categories. See Wal Mart Store No. 0619 v. Kirksey, 728 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing benefits award where there was no medical evidence besides the inadmissible testimony of an unauthorized treating physician regarding the causation between the industrial accident and claimant’s medical condition); see also Clairson Intern. v. Rose, 718 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bassett v. Laber, 722 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Dr. Block was not appointed by the JCC, was not designated as an independent medical examiner, and was not an authorized provider. Therefore, the JCC properly excluded the medical opinion testimony of Dr. Block.
Without Dr. Block’s testimony, there is no competent substantial evidence to support findings of either the medical necessity of the treatment or the causal relationship between the work-related injury and the June 2000 emergency room treatment. See generally, Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Mann, 690 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (ruling the JCC erred in authorizing certain medical care absent evidence that such care was medically necessary; claimant presented no medical testimony that her condition was causally related to her industrial injury). Therefore, the JCC erred in awarding medical expenses for claimant’s emergency room treatment and in awarding temporary total disability benefits for June 27, 2000, through July 10, 2000.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
VAN NORTWICK and POLSTON, JJ., concur. . Section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part:
(e) No medical opinion other than the opinion of a medical advisor appointed by the judge of compensation claims or division, an independent medical examiner, or an authorized treating provider is admissible in proceedings before the judges of compensation claims.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., 130 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…can, under appropriate circumstances, be established by non-expert testimony. See Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trustees v. Stone ex rel. Stone, 92 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). . We are mindful of our opinion in Chudnof-James v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc,, 827 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), where we concluded that the only evidence to support the causal relationship or the medical necessity of the emergency treatment was the opinion of the emergency room physician, which was inadmissible under section 440.13(5)(e);…
-
Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Preferred Governmental Claim Solutions v. Candiss Tweedie, 922 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…- or, an independent medical examiner, and an authorized treating provider. The law is clear that a JCC errs in admitting the opinion testimony of a physician who does not fall into one of these categories. Chudnof-James v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 827 So. 2d 369, 370-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). As it is undisputed that Dr. Masters was not a medical advisor or an independent medical examiner, the question becomes whether he was an authorized treating provider, which means a provider who has been authorized by a…
-
Church's Chicken and The Hartford v. Meischel Anderson, 112 So. 3d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…bills were deemed by the JCC to have been provided “on an emergency basis.” The law provides that a JCC’s award of unauthorized emergency room treatment is reviewed for competent, substantial evidence. See Chudnof-James v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 827 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing JCC’s award of medical expenses for emergency room treatment where competent, substantial evidence failed to support finding of medical necessity and causal relationship). It was Claimant’s burden to prove that th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Clairson Int'l & Crawford & Co. v. Rose, 718 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Gallagher Bassett & Valencia Cmty. Coll. v. Laber, 722 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Solomon Malka v. Lawrence, 690 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- WAL Mart Stores, Inc. v. Mann, 690 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Wal-Mart Store # 0649 v. Ingabarg Kirksey, 728 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)