VIDA R. WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF EDGAR B. WILLIAMS, DECEASED; SU-WANNEE RIVER HOLSTEIN, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AND FLORIDA VEAL, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
SUSQUEHANNA VEAL FARMS, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND SUSQUEHANNA INDUSTRIES, INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Fla. 1st DCA | 2002-10-04
No. ID01-3984
ERVIN, BOOTH and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.
828 So. 2d 420 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that dismissal for failure to prosecute under rule 1.420(e) applies to the entire action, not just specific claims or parties. The trial court erred in not dismissing the entire action.


Facts & Procedural History

The trial court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute after the appellants failed to submit record activity for one year and did not show good c…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal and cross-appeal arise from the trial court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute the case below. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that Appellants failed to submit any record activity for one year preceding the motion to dismiss and failed to show good cause precluding dismissal. However, we agree with the argument on cross-appeal that the entire action should have been dismissed.

The trial court reversibly erred by declining to dismiss the entire action as to all defendants. Dismissal for failure to prosecute under rule 1.420(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is a remedy that is available only as to an entire case. On a motion for failure to prosecute, a court may not dismiss a single claim among others, nor one defending party among others. See Gadinsky v. Bruno, 695 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Utset v. Campos, 548 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Simmons v. Dakal Dev. Corp., 632 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Cross Appellants have standing to appeal the order of dismissal because the order was not wholly favorable to them. See Katz v. Red Top Sedan, 136 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Save Anna Maria, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 700 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute and reverse as to that portion of the order declining to dismiss all defendants. The case is remanded for entry of an order dismissing the entire action.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

ERVIN, BOOTH and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.


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Citator

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  • Jones v. Volunteers OF Am. N. & Cent. Fla., Inc., 834 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …nt against Cullen or to dismiss Cullen from the suit. Instead, Jones did nothing and Cullen continued to be a party to the action. The entire action was subject to dismissal, not just the inactive defendant. Williams v. Susquehanna Veal Farms, Inc., 828 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that dismissal for failure to prosecute under rule 1.420(e) is a remedy that is available only as to an entire case); Magers v. Walker’s Cay Air Terminal, Inc., 451 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (same). Because there w…

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