BRAD CANTRALL, PETITIONER,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, RESPONDENT
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Brad Cantrall petitioned for a writ of certiorari to challenge the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' revocation of his driver's license, which was issued in 1999 despite a 1998 statutory amendment that rendered him ineligible. The court held that the amended statute applied to his 1999 application and upheld the Department's decision to revoke the license.
The court held that Florida follows the general rule that a change in a licensure statute occurring during the pendency of an application is operative as to the application, so the law as changed—not as it existed when the application was filed—determines whether the license should be granted. The circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of law by applying the 1998 statute to Cantrall's 1999 application.
[1] A change in a licensure statute that occurs during the pendency of an application for licensure is operative as to the application, and the law as changed determines whet…
[2] A court reviewing an administrative decision must apply the law in effect at the time of the agency's decision.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a change in a licensure statute that occurs during the pendency of an application for licensure is operative as to the application, so that the law as changed, rather than as it existed at the time the application was filed, determines whether the license should be granted”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that amended statutes apply to pending applications, requiring application of the law in effect at the time of decision rather than at the time of application filing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCantrall's driver's license was revoked in August 1988 after his fourth DUI conviction. Under the 1987 statute, he could have applied for reinstatemen…
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BLUE, Chief Judge.
Brad Cantrall petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the circuit court, which denied certiorari and refused to quash an order by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles cancelling his driver’s license. We deny the petition.
Cantrall’s driver’s license was revoked in August 1988 after his fourth conviction for driving under the influence (DUI). At that time, section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes (1987), provided that he could apply for a driver’s license after ten years if he met certain conditions, such as no intervening convictions requiring mandatory license revocation. Effective July 1, 1998, however, the legislature amended section 322.271(4) and removed the language that would have allowed a four-time DUI offender to obtain a driver’s license. Ch. 98-223, Laws of Fla. In 1999, Cantrall applied for, and received, a driver’s license. The Department subsequently revoked his driver’s license pursuant to section 322.22, Florida Statutes (1999), which states that the Department is authorized “to cancel any license, upon determining that the licensee was not entitled to the issuance thereof.” Cantrall sought certiorari review of the Department’s order, which the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, denied. In this second-tier certiorari, Cant-rall asks this court to quash the circuit court’s order and require the Department to reinstate his driver’s license.
A two-part inquiry is required before granting second-tier certiorari relief: first, whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process; and second, whether it departed from the essential requirements of the law, which is a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla.1995). Cantrall was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard before the circuit court; therefore, he received procedural due process. He argues that the circuit court violated a clearly established principle of law by applying the 1998 statute, instead of the 1987 statute, to his 1999 application. We reject this argument.
Florida follows the general rule that a change in a licensure statute that occurs-during the pendency of an application for licensure is operative as to the application, so that the law as changed, rather than as it existed at the time the application was filed, determines whether the license should be granted. In Ziffrin [Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 63 S.Ct. 465, 87 L.Ed. 621 (1943) ], the United States Supreme Court reasoned that just as a change in the law between a [jury trial] and an appellate decision requires the appellate court to apply the changed law, so, by like token, a change of law pending an administrative hearing or act must be followed in relation to a permit for the doing of a future act. Otherwise, said the [C]ourt, the administrative body would be issuing a permit contrary to existing legislation.
Lavemia v. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Med., 616 So. 2d 53, 53-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citations omitted).
By applying the law in effect at the time of Cantrall’s application and the time of the Department’s decision, the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law.
Petition denied.
DAVIS and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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Lescher v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 946 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…003, when the amendment held unconstitutional in Critchfield was reenacted. In this case petitioner applied for reinstatement of his driver’s license- as a hardship on August 3, 2005. Under Cantrall v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 828 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the statute in effect at the time of application for reinstatement of a driver’s license controls, not the statute in effect when the driver’s license was revoked. We agree with Cantrall. Hill v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor V…
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Corcoran, 133 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…administrative review hearing where the driver has received notice and has been given an opportunity to be heard. See Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Griffin, 909 So. 2d 538, 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Cantrall v. Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 828 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Stewart, 625 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In determining whether the lower court applied the correct law, this Court may consider, among other things, recent controlling case law,…
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Gaskins, 891 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…emphasis added). Because Gaskins has a DUI manslaughter conviction and two prior DUI convictions, he is ineligible to petition for reinstatement under this version of section 322.271(4). In Cantrall v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 828 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), this court recognized that the statute in effect at the time of the application for reinstatement of driving privilege and the time of the Department’s decision controlled, rather than the statute in effect at the time Cant…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Ziffrin v. United States, 318 U.S. 73 (U.S. 1943)
- Henry Lavernia, M.D. v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 616 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)