ROBERT BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Robert Brown appealed the summary denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the denial of his first two claims but reversed and remanded his third claim regarding counsel's failure to file a demand for speedy trial.
The court affirmed the summary denial of the first two ineffective assistance claims as conclusively refuted by the record, but reversed and remanded the third claim regarding the failure to file a demand for speedy trial because the trial court failed to provide record attachments that conclusively refuted the claim.
[1] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
[2] Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by specific facts that are not conclusively refuted by the record.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order for an appellant to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that counsel's performance was outside of the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and that such conduct in fact prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings.”
Establishes the two-prong Strickland test that applies to ineffective assistance claims
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown filed a postconviction motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on three grounds: counsel failed to file a motion to suppress testimony…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Performance Prong Of Strickland cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for postcon-viction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which the appellant claimed to have suffered ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to file a motion to suppress testimony, failed to properly impeach a witness, and failed to file a demand for speedy trial. We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the appellant’s first two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because these claims are conclusively refuted by the record. However, we reverse and remand the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s third claim.
In order for an appellant to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that counsel’s performance was outside of the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and that such conduct in fact prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-92,104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1995); Betts v. State, 792 So. 2d 589, 589-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). The appellant must allege specific facts which are not conclusively rebutted by the record and which demonstrate that such deficiency in counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant. Betts, 792 So. 2d at 590.
As to the first prong of Strickland, the appellant alleged that he specifically asked counsel to file a demand for speedy trial and that counsel failed to file the motion. As to the second prong, the appellant alleged that he filed a writ of prohibition after being incarcerated for 211 days, and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s omission because the trial court denied his writ of prohibition on the basis that his counsel had not filed a demand for speedy trial. We conclude the allegations are sufficient to state a legally sufficient claim. See e.g. Greeson v. State, 729 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Toliver v. State, 652 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Pippin v. State, 626 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Because the trial court did not refute this claim with record attachments, the trial court’s summary denial of the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to file a demand for speedy trial is reversed and remanded for record attachments that conclusively refute his claim, or for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.
KAHN, BENTON, and LEWIS, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…d, by contrast, relies on First District cases in which the court has required evidentiary hearings on this type of claim. See, e.g., Gee v. State, 13 So. 3d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Burke v. State, 855 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Brown v. State, 829 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The movants in the above cases, however, specified some reasonable basis to conclude that the failure to move for speedy trial discharge caused prejudice. Hammond’s claim is insufficient. A claim of ineffective assistance of co…
-
Burke v. State, 855 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…f appellant or that appellant was otherwise not entitled to discharge under Rule 3.191. Thus, the trial court’s summary denial of relief on the first ground was improper. See Johnson v. State, 840 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Brown v. State, 829 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). As to all grounds raised except the first, the trial court’s order is affirmed. As to the first ground, the order is reversed, and remanded with directions either to attach portions of the record conclusively refuting app…
-
GEE v. State, 13 So. 3d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…ed the motion to dismiss because defense counsel had failed to follow the proper procedure. See Gee v. State, 954 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We conclude the allegations are sufficient to state a legally sufficient claim. See e.g. Brown v. State, 829 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Greeson v. State, 729 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Because the trial court did not refute this claim with record attachments, the trial court’s summary denial of the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fo…
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1995)
- Betts v. State, 792 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Greeson v. State, 729 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Black v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 652 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Haley Bascom Pippin v. State, 626 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)