JOHN R. MCMASTER-WADE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2002-11-08
No. 2D02-2449
GREEN and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
830 So. 2d 217 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

McMaster-Wade appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing he could not receive a habitual violent felony offender sentence on a life felony kidnapping charge. The court held that habitual sentences could not be imposed on life felonies under Florida law at the time of the offenses, and the trial court failed to conclusively refute this claim in the record.


Holding

McMaster-Wade's claim that he could not receive a habitual sentence for the kidnapping because it was a life felony is cognizable and correct under Florida law. The trial court failed to conclusively refute this claim in the record, requiring reversal and remand.


Headnotes

[1] A habitual violent felony offender sentence cannot be imposed on a life felony.

[2] A claim that a defendant was illegally sentenced by receiving a habitual violent felony offender sentence on a life felony is cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Pr…

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Key Quotes

“McMaster-Wade is correct that at the time the offenses were committed, habitual sentences could not be imposed on life felonies.”

Establishes the core legal principle that habitual sentencing enhancements were prohibited for life felonies under 1990 Florida law

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Facts & Procedural History

In August 1990, McMaster-Wade committed kidnapping, lewd and lascivious act, and seven sexual batteries against a victim under age thirteen. He receiv…

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Opinion of the Court
SILBERMAN, Judge.

[*218] SILBERMAN, Judge.

John R. McMaster-Wade appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). In August 1990, McMaster Wade committed a kidnapping, a lewd and lascivious act, and seven sexual batteries. He received habitual violent felony offender sentences on all counts. In the rule 3.800(a) motion, McMaster-Wade contends that he could not receive a habitual sentence for the kidnapping because it was a life felony. McMaster-Wade is correct that at the time the offenses were committed, habitual sentences could not be imposed on life felonies. See Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla.1992). This claim is cognizable under rule 3.800(a). See Young v. State, 787 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The trial court failed to refute conclusively this claim. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Under section 787.01(3), Florida Statutes (1989), kidnapping is enhanced to a life felony if the victim is under the age of thirteen, and during the course of the kidnapping, the defendant commits one of several enumerated offenses, including sexual battery. The record on appeal does not include the information or the verdict form, but the sentencing transcript indicates that McMaster-Wade’s charge of kidnapping was enhanced to a life felony because the victim was under the age of thirteen and a sexual battery occurred during the course of the kidnapping.

The kidnapping was listed and scored as a life felony on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet, and the judgment shows that the kidnapping was a violation of both section 787.01(l)(a)(2) and section 787.01(3), Florida Statutes (1989). While the judgment states that the offense was a first-degree felony, in light of the other portions of the record, this would seem to be a scrivener’s error. However, we cannot resolve the discrepancy based on the limited record before us.

Because the trial court did not attach to its order any portion of the record that conclusively refutes McMaster-Wade’s claim, we reverse and remand this issue. On remand, the trial court shall determine whether McMaster-Wade was, in fact, habitualized on a life felony. If the trial court finds that he was illegally sentenced, the trial court shall resentence him to a legal sentence. If the trial court finds that he was not illegally sentenced, the trial court shall attach to its order those portions of the record that conclusively refute McMaster-Wade’s claim.

Reversed and remanded.

GREEN and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Johnson v. State, 847 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under the statute in effect at the time of the offense. We agree. See Cole v. State, 716 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). This claim is cognizable in a 3.800(a) motion. See McMaster-Wade v. State, 830 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We therefore remand to the trial court to strike Johnson’s habitual offender designation on counts one through six. It is not necessary for Johnson to be resentenced on those counts since the offense of attempted murder of a law…

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