JOHNNIE FRANK THORNTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A sentence to probation, being more lenient than a term of years, cannot be an authorized habitual felony offender sentence, precluding a habitual offender sentence upon revocation.
Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to drug and theft charges and was initially sentenced to probation. Upon revocation, the court imposed a habitual fe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Habitual Felony Offender Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
[*268] SILBERMAN, Judge.
Johnnie Frank Thornton appeals the order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). He claims that his placement on probation as a habitual felony offender was not an authorized habitual offender sentence and was not based on a negotiated plea; thus, he could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon revocation of his probation. We agree.
On August 6, 1990, Thornton entered an open nolo contendere plea in two separate cases before Judge Harry Lee Coe. The charges were possession of cocaine and grand theft auto. The plea form states that the maximum sentence that could be imposed was five years in prison on each charge. Judge Coe, however, signed a “Subsequent Felony Notice,” and filed it in open court. At the sentencing hearing-nine days later, Judge Coe imposed concurrent terms of three years' probation. He provided a copy of the written subsequent felony offender notice to Thornton and designated him a subsequent felony offender as special condition 33 on his probation order. Later, Thornton’s probation was revoked. Judge Coe imposed twenty years in prison, ten years consecutively on each charge, as a habitual felony offender. We reverse under the authority of Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Thornton’s sentences to probation were more lenient than sentences to a term of years and were, therefore, not authorized habitual felony offender sentences. Id. at 620. Consequently, the trial court was precluded from imposing a habitual offender sentence upon revocation of his probation. Id. at 621.
Because the habitual offender sentence imposed upon the revocation of Thornton’s probation is illegal, we reverse. Because Mr. Thornton has served the statutory maximum sentences for the offenses, on remand he is entitled to release.
Reversed and remanded.
GREEN and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Raines v. State, 14 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…all references to "subsequent felony offenders.” Unfortunately, fifteen years later, Judge Coe was still prone to use the old terminology and often the old procedures. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 845 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Thornton v. State, 830 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Bogush v. State, 597 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Hubbard v. State, 588 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). So long as the sentence complied with the applicable "habitual offender” sentencing requirements, this court never regarded r…
Authorities Cited
- Collazo v. Moore, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)