MICHAEL BROWN,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Brown appealed his convictions for armed burglary, grand theft auto, and aggravated assault with a firearm, challenging primarily his life sentence imposed under Florida's prison releasee reoffender statute. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed all convictions and sentences, though it certified a constitutional question regarding the statute's validity to the Florida Supreme Court.
The court affirmed the life sentence imposed under the prison releasee reoffender statute. The court held that section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) applies to 'felonies punishable by life,' which unambiguously includes both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by life, so Brown's life sentence was legal.
[1] A life sentence may be imposed under the prison releasee reoffender punishment statute for a first-degree felony punishable by life.
[2] The prison releasee reoffender punishment statute's use of the term "felony punishable by life" encompasses both life felonies and first-degree felonies punishable by lif…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Subsection 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) provides for an enhanced life sentence for a 'felony punishable by life.' The statute does not use the term 'life felony,' but rather uses the term 'felony punishable by life,' which includes both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by life.”
Establishes the court's statutory interpretation that the enhanced sentencing provision applies to both categories of felonies
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was convicted of armed burglary, grand theft auto, and aggravated assault with a firearm. He was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm all five issues appellant raised in this appeal from convictions for armed burglary, grand theft auto, and aggravated assault with a firearm. We write only on two of the issues concerning appellant’s sentence under the prison-releasee reof-fender statute.
Appellant was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), to life imprisonment for his armed burglary conviction. He challenges section 775.082(8) on the .same grounds this court rejected in Turner v. State, 745 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and Durden v. State, 743 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Although we affirm on this point, in accordance with Turner, and Durden we certify the following question to the.Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
Appellant also challenges his life sentence, asserting that because his armed burglary conviction is a first degree felony punishable by life, not a life felony, the maximum sentence he could have received under section 775.082(8) was 30 years; hence, his life sentence is illegal. In support of his argument, appellant points to Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), wherein the Florida Supreme Court designated the following five types of felonies: capital, life, first degree, second degree, and third degree, and stated that first degree felonies punishable by life were first degree felonies regardless of the sentence imposed (life or a term of years). Id. at 268-69. Appellant argues that because he was convicted of a first degree felony, section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(b) provides a maximum sentence of 30 years. We cannot agree.
Subsection 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) provides for an enhanced life sentence for a “felony punishable by life.” The statute does not use the term “life felony,” but rather uses the term “felony punishable by life,” which includes both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by life. Because appellant’s armed burglary conviction under section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), is a first degree felony punishable by life, the life sentence imposed under section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) was legal. In so saying, we are not persuaded by appellant’s analogy to the habitual felony offender statute, which at one point did not include an enhancement for life felonies. See Burdick; Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992). Unlike the habitual felony offender statute, section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) unambiguously includes both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by life.
Appellant’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ, CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992)
- Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992)
- Mundy v. State, 745 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Durden v. State, 743 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)