STEVE BRANA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this postconviction appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded, finding that appellant's claim that his counsel misadvised him about concurrent sentencing was not conclusively refuted by the record and warranted further proceedings. The court held that counsel's statements about sentence concurrency could constitute actionable misadvice sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea.
The court held that appellant's claims were not conclusively refuted by the record because nothing in the plea form or plea colloquy addressed whether promises were made regarding sentencing concurrency, and counsel's statement about concurrent sentences could reasonably be understood as a statement of law rather than a promise. The court reversed and remanded for either additional record evidence or an evidentiary hearing.
[1] A defendant's claim that counsel provided misadvice regarding the concurrency of sentences, inducing a plea, is not conclusively refuted by a plea form stating nothing wa…
[2] A trial court's failure to inquire of a defendant whether anything was promised to them is insufficient to conclusively rebut a claim of attorney misadvice regarding sent…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there may also be a difference between a 'promise' as commonly understood, and an attorney's expert advice to his client.... Supplying such advice is not necessarily a promise of an outcome.”
Establishes the legal distinction between counsel's statements of law and promises that would constitute grounds for plea withdrawal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant accepted a plea admitting to a probation violation allegedly based on his counsel's misstatement that his sentence would run concurrently wi…
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ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION
WARNER, J.
We grant the motion for rehearing and clarification, withdraw our previously issued opinion, and substitute the following in its place.
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief, appellant alleges that counsel’s misstatements that his sentence would run concurrently with his other sentences prompted him to accept a plea he would not have otherwise accepted. He also alleges that he was on medication, which affected his ability to understand the plea proceedings. Because these claims are not conclusively refuted by the record, we reverse.
Appellant claims he admitted to violating his probation based upon his counsel’s misadviee that his sentence would run concurrently with the sentence recently imposed upon him in another case in another county. Had counsel not so advised him, he would not have admitted the violation of probation. Because the concurrent nature of the sentence was not addressed at his sentencing, his sentence was made consecutive to his other sentences. Nothing in the plea form or plea colloquy refuted this claim. In his plea form appellant agreed that nothing was promised or represented to him, other than what was contained in the plea agreement.
The trial court did not inquire of appellant whether he was promised anything. Under State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1996), this is insufficient to conclusively rebut appellant’s claim. The supreme court in Leroux noted, “there may also be a difference between a ‘promise’ as commonly understood, and an attorney’s expert advice to his client.... Supplying such advice is not necessarily a promise of an outcome.” Id. at 237. When appellant’s attorney told him the sentences would be concurrent, appellant could have reasonably understood that as a statement of law, not a promise or a representation given to induce the plea. See id.; Carter v. State, 752 So. 2d 725, 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Raben v. State, 715 So. 2d 331, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
We affirm as to the remaining issue raised as that was conclusively refuted by the record.
We reverse and remand for either the attachment of additional portions of the record that conclusively show appellant is entitled to no relief or for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FARMER and MAY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Peloquin v. State, 858 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…s attorney made any representations or promises regarding the length and nature of the sentence he would receive, the trial court erred in summarily denying the motion to withdraw plea. See State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1996); Brana v. State, 830 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Johnson v. State, 757 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s claim that his lawyer represented that the trial court would grant his motion for downward depar…
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Quannah Bowers v. State, 862 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…noted in Leroux, “[T]here may also be a difference between a ‘promise’ as commonly understood, and an attorney’s expert advice to his client.... Supplying such advice is not necessarily a promise of an outcome.” Id. at 237. See also Brana v. State, 830 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(finding when appellant’s attorney told him the sentences would be concurrent, appellant could have reasonably understood that as a statement of law, not a promise or a representation given to induce the plea). In this case, the a…
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Medina v. State, 860 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…e, no one has made any promises or guarantees to me ... I am doing this freely and voluntarily.” We conclude that this language is insufficient to conclusively rebut appellant’s claim under State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1996); Brana v. State, 830 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We therefore reverse. FARMER, C.J, POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1996)
- Carter v. State, 752 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Raben v. State, 715 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)