RONALD P. BAKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ronald Baker appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule 3.800(a). Baker was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender based on a prior aggravated assault conviction, but argues he should not qualify because a subsequent resentencing in the prior case would have resulted in an earlier release date. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Baker's theoretical speculation about an earlier release date does not provide a basis to challenge the habitual offender classification.
The court held that an habitual offender sentence can only be corrected under Rule 3.800(a) when the sentence could not have been imposed as a matter of law and the error is apparent on the face of the record. Because Baker's argument is based only on speculation about what his release date would have been had he been properly sentenced previously, and the prior conviction was not set aside, no error is apparent on the record and the motion to correct sentence was properly denied.
[1] A defendant's habitual violent offender classification is supported by evidence establishing the defendant's release date from a prior commitment, even if the defendant s…
[2] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) is appropriate only when the sentence could not have been imposed as a matter of law and the error is apparent…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An habitual offender sentence can be corrected under Rule 3.800(a), but only when the sentence could not have been imposed as a matter of law, and the error is apparent on the face of the record.”
Establishes the legal standard for correcting habitual offender sentences—the error must be apparent on the face of the record, not based on speculation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1992, Baker was sentenced in Seminole County to 70 years incarceration (35 years active, 35 years suspended) as a habitual violent felony offender …
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PLEUS, J.
Ronald P. Baker appeals an order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 8.800(a) and 3.850. In 1992, the defendant was sentenced in Case No. 91-2533 in Seminole County as an habitual violent felony offender to 70 years incarceration for burglary with an assault, with the balance suspended after 35 years and the remainder to be spent on probation.
The prior felony conviction used to support the habitual violent offender classification was an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction in Pinellas County. In the Pinellas County case, Baker was also convicted of burglary with an assault, and was sentenced to seven years incarceration for the burglary, and five years incarceration for the aggravated assault, to be served concurrently. In adjudicating defendant as an habitual violent offender in the instant case, the Seminole County court found that defendant had committed his offense within five years of his release from prison in the Pinellas County case. See § 775.084(l)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2001).
On July 16, 2000, the circuit court in Pinellas County granted, in part, a Rule 3.850 motion/error coram nobis claim filed by the defendant. The defendant had argued that the sentencing scoresheet improperly listed the burglary with an assault offense as a life felony instead of as a first degree felony punishable by life. Even though the defendant was no longer in custody as the result of those crimes, and the claim was not based on newly discovered evidence, the circuit court ordered resentencing. Defendant now argues in his 3.800(a) motion that he did not qualify as an habitual violent offender in the Seminole County case because he should have been released from prison on an earlier date, and therefore would not have committed his offense within five years of his release from prison. The habitual offender statute does not provide for this type of theoretical speculation. The defendant’s release date from his pri-or commitment was established by the evidence and was sufficient to support the habitual violent offender classification. Even though the circuit court in Pinellas County granted defendant’s 3.850 motion, and the defendant had already served his sentence, there is no way to alter his release date from that sentence. At the time of his release, defendant had statutory notice of the habitual offender requirements, and committed an offense within five years of his release.
This is not a case where an essential predicate felony conviction has been set aside.1 The defendant is only surmising that he would have been released from prison earlier had he been properly sentenced in the prior case.
An habitual offender sentence can be corrected under Rule 3.800(a), but only when the sentence could not have been imposed as a matter of law, and the error is apparent on the face of the record. See Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246 (Fla.2001). In this case, no error is apparent on the face of the record. Nor is there any need for an evidentiary hearing under Rule 3.850, as defendant has not pled sufficient allegations to show that he was unlawfully sentenced. The order denying defendant’s motion to correct sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN and PALMER, JJ., concur. . Cf. Monroe v. State, 476 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (where prior predicate conviction is set aside after defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, proper remedy to challenge habitualization is by post-conviction motion).
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Baker v. State, 91 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Baker v. State, 33 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (affirming with citation to Fitzpatrick v. State, 868 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); Baker v. State, 831 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“Even though the circuit court in Pinellas County granted defendant’s 3.850 motion, and the defendant had already served his sentence, there is no way to alter his release date from that sentence. At the time of his release…
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Williams v. State, 242 So. 3d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…. 2d DCA 2004); Brown v. State, 827 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Harris v. State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Desmond v. State, 576 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); - 2 - Baker v. State, 91 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Baker v. State, 831 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). NORTHCUTT, LUCAS, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.…
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Solomon v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Rangel v. State, 937 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Johnson v. State, 917 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Lynch v. State, 881 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Gutierrez v. State, 854 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Baker v. State, 831 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Woods v. State, 807 So. 2d - 2 - 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Edwards v. State, 743 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Middleton v. State, 721 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). SILBERMAN, LaROSE, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2001)
- Vaughn Monroe v. State, 476 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)