STEWART TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
MIRIAM HOPE TAYLOR, APPELLEE
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The court held that a trial court cannot issue directives for exclusive use of a residence and no contact between parties after dismissing a domestic violence injunction for lack of evidence.
The trial court dismissed a temporary domestic violence injunction due to insufficient evidence presented by the Mother. Despite dismissal, the court …
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WHATLEY, Judge.
The Father requests that this court dissolve any and all trial court orders keeping him out of his home and away from the Mother. However, the only order before this court for review is that entered on January 15, 2002. The other orders mentioned by the Father in his argument were entered after the notice of appeal was filed, and therefore, they are not properly before this court for review.
In the January 15, 2002, order, the trial court dismissed the temporary domestic violence injunction because the Mother had not “presented credible evidence that she has been the victim of domestic violence and that she has reasonable cause to believe that she is in imminent danger from domestic violence.” In other words, the trial court found that neither of the statutory prerequisites for the issuance of a domestic violence injunction was established by the Mother. § 741.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2001).
Notwithstanding this finding, the court directed the Father to continue to have no contact with the Mother and the children and awarded the Mother exclusive use and occupancy of the residence. Although these directives are allowed if an injunction is entered, § 741.30(6)(a), the trial court dismissed the injunction in this case. The trial court’s sua sponte consolidation of the Mother’s petition for an injunction with the Mother’s subsequently filed paternity action did not confer authority on the court to enter these directives against the Father. Accordingly, we quash that part of the January 15, 2002, order enjoining the Father from contact with the Mother and the children and awarding the Mother exclusive use and occupancy of the residence.
FULMER, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.
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Coleman v. Coleman, 906 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…injunction were not satisfied and denied the petitions. That being so, the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue an order for exclusive use and occupancy of the parties’ dwelling under section 741.30, Florida Statutes. See Taylor v. Taylor, 831 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA2002). We grant the petition for writ of prohibition. This ruling is without prejudice to either party to seek an appropriate order for exclusive use and occupancy in the pending dissolution of marriage case. Petition granted.…
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Jamila Takiyak Hunter v. Booker, 133 So. 3d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…t order granting husband exclusive use and possession of marital residence after denying husband’s petition for injunction, because section 741.30 only permits such relief when requirements for issuing an injunction are satisfied); Taylor v. Taylor, 831 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (quashing, for lack of authority, portion of order dismissing mother’s temporary injunction in which trial court also enjoined father from contact with mother and children and awarded mother exclusive use of marital home). M…