D.G., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for cocaine possession after police arrested him without probable cause. The appellate court reversed, holding that the initial detention and subsequent search were illegal because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The court reversed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that D.G. was illegally arrested because the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion that he committed a crime, and therefore the cocaine should have been suppressed.
[1] Tangible evidence found on a person must be suppressed if it is discovered as a result of an illegal arrest.
[2] A person has an affirmative right to avoid police contact absent reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Absent reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime, a person has an affirmative right to avoid police contact.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional principle upon which the reversal is based.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer observed D.G. chasing another person down a street at night. When confronted, D.G. explained he was chasing the person because that p…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant D.G., a juvenile (“D.G.”), appeals his adjudication of delinquency claiming the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress tangible evidence. We reverse finding D.G. was searched pursuant to an illegal arrest, and thus the drugs found on his person should have been suppressed.
D.G. was charged by petition with possession of cocaine and resisting arrest without violence, after an officer observed him chasing another person down a street late one night. When confronted by the police officer, D.G. told the officer that he was chasing the third person because that person owed D.G. money. The officer did not believe a crime was being committed and did not intend to arrest D.G.
However, when D.G. turned his back on the officer and tried to walk away from her, the officer grabbed D.G.’s shirt and decided to detain him in order to complete her investigation. The officer radioed for back-up and shortly thereafter another officer arrived on the scene.
When the second officer arrived, he observed the first officer trying to handcuff D.G. The two officers then forced D.G.’s hands behind his back and handcuffed him. The second officer discovered a plastic bottle in D.G.’s front pocket which contained a cocaine rock. The second officer testified that he believed D.G. was under arrest and was going to charge D.G. with resisting arrest.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine and found that the first officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for resisting arrest without violence. We disagree.
Absent reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime, a person has an affirmative right to avoid police contact. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Without a founded suspicion of criminal activity, a police officer does not have the right to detain a person absent that person’s consent. See Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Here, the first officer testified she did not believe D.G. had committed a crime when she stopped him. The first officer further testified she did not intend to arrest D.G. at the time he attempted to walk away from her. In the absence of any facts or circumstances supporting a reasonable suspicion D.G. committed a crime, there was no probable cause to arrest D.G., and the drugs found as a result of the illegal arrest should have been suppressed. See Baker v. State, 813 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d at 667; State v. Arnold, 475 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court order denying D.G.’s motion to suppress.
Reversed.
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O.B. v. State, 36 So. 3d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…d a crime, and, hence, there was no probable cause to arrest [him].... Therefore, as there was not going to be an arrest, logically, [the juvenile] cannot be charged with having resisted an arrest.” D.T.B., 892 So. 2d at 525; see also D.G. v. State, 831 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). All that the officer testified to was that he was dispatched in response to a burglary in the neighborhood. The trial court deemed the contents of the BOLO inadmissible hearsay; therefore, it is unknown whether a description of t…
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D.T.B. v. State, 892 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…ishing the elements of the state’s case. State v. Williams, 742 So. 2d 509, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish each element of the crime charged). In D.G. v. State, 831 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), this Court, citing Wardlow, articulated the rule that “[ajbsent reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime, a person has an affirmative right to avoid police contact.” In D.G., as here, there were no facts or circumst…
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M.M.H. v. State, 929 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ies the officer’s detention of the defendant, and (2) the defendant fled with knowledge that the officer intended to detain him or her.” Id. at 524 (quoting V.L. v. State, 790 So. 2d 1140, 1142-43 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). See [*630] also D.G. v. State, 831 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(“Absent reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime, a person has an affirmative right to avoid police contact.”). Moreover, even if a person is within a suspected crime area, flight itself, is insufficient to justify a…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1983)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000)
- Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- State v. Arnold, 475 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Baker v. State, 813 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)