CALVIN C. LUTON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Calvin Luton appeals his conviction for strong arm robbery, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial based on an officer's testimony about the high-crime nature of the area. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the officer's remarks were not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, particularly where identification was the key issue.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. The officer's remarks were not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, particularly because the central issue at trial was identification, not whether a crime occurred, and the trial court had sustained an objection and offered a curative instruction that the defense declined.
[1] A motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and should only be granted in cases of absolute necessity.
[2] A mistrial should be granted only when the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and should only be granted in cases of absolute necessity. Moreover, a mistrial should be granted only in circumstances where 'the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.'”
Establishes the high standard required for granting a mistrial and the court's framework for analyzing mistrial motions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 2, 2000, Saul Aguilar was attacked and robbed of $300 outside a restaurant after midnight. Officer Sosa, patrolling nearby, witnessed the robb…
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RAMIREZ, J.
Calvin C. Luton appeals his conviction for strong arm robbery. We affirm because the officer’s remarks during the trial did not constitute grounds for mistrial.
On July 2, 2000, Saul Aguilar was leaving a restaurant sometime after midnight when he was hit on the head from behind. He lost consciousness and did not see who hit him. When Aguilar came to, Officer Sosa was present, but Aguilar’s pay of $300 was missing.
Officer Sosa was on patrol duty in the vicinity of Krome Avenue and 9th Street in south Miami-Dade County. While parked with his lights off, he witnessed the robbery from a block away, through his binoculars. Officer Sosa then drove towards the crime scene where he observed the robber punch the victim repeatedly and search through the victim’s pockets. He then chased the robber in his patrol car as the robber sped away on a bicycle. He got within three feet of the robber and immediately recognized him as Luton. During the pursuit Officer Sosa’s car headlights clearly illuminated Luton, and he was able to look at Luton three times. Luton subsequently dropped his bicycle, jumped a fence and got away.
At trial, Officer Sosa testified that he was patrolling the area because it is a high crime area, mostly violent crime, and that there had been numerous complaints of crime in that area. The trial court sustained the objection and offered to give a curative instruction. The defense declined the trial court’s offer. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. In Kivett v. State, 629 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), we stated that “[a] motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and should only be granted in cases of absolute necessity. Moreover, a mistrial should be granted only in circumstances where ‘the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.’ ” Id. at 250 (quoting from Duest v. State, 462 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla.1985) (citations omitted)). We do not believe that Officer Sosa’s comments were so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial as the issue at trial was identification, not whether the crime was committed. Where the crime took place was not important. See also Goodwin v. State, 721 So. 2d 728, 728-729 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (no prejudicial error resulted from testifying officer’s comment that the area was known for drug sales where trial court sustained objection and gave curative instruction to disregard the comment); McCall v. State, 463 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (detective’s comment did not rise to level of prejudicial error where defendant failed to request curative instruction which would have cured error).
We also find no merit in Luton’s other arguments.
Affirmed.
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Lidiano v. State, 967 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…mitted, was not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. Duest v. State, 462 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla.1985) (holding that “a mistrial is appropriate only when the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial”); Luton v. State, 831 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that mistrial should be granted only when improper comment was so prejudicial as to vitiate entire trial). The shooter, who Mr. Retureta knew as “Robertico,” was well-known to him as he had been a frequent customer, appe…
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Clark v. State, 924 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…the comments were so prejudicial as to taint the entire trial. See Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1999)(denial of motion for mistrial abuse of discretion only where complained of remarks so prejudicial as to require reversal); Luton v. State, 831 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(in a case of strong-arm robbery, testimony of an officer that he^was in the area where the arrest took place because it was a high crime area and that there were numerous complaints of crime, did not require a mistrial where the i…
Authorities Cited
- Duest v. State, 462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
- McCALL v. State, 463 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Singletary v. Vargas, 721 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Goodwin v. State, 721 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Perez v. State, 629 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Kivett v. State, 629 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)