J.A., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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J.A. appeals his juvenile delinquency adjudication under Tampa's curfew ordinance, arguing it is unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court previously directed this court to apply strict scrutiny rather than heightened scrutiny in evaluating juvenile curfew ordinances. Upon remand and applying strict scrutiny, this court reverses the adjudication, finding the ordinance unconstitutional.
The proper test for determining the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance is strict scrutiny, not heightened scrutiny. Upon applying strict scrutiny, the Tampa ordinance is unconstitutional, and the adjudication of delinquency must be reversed.
[1] The proper test for determining the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance is strict scrutiny.
[2] A juvenile curfew ordinance may be found unconstitutional when subjected to strict scrutiny review.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the proper test for determining the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance is strict scrutiny”
The Florida Supreme Court's directive on the applicable standard of review, which required reversal of the lower court's heightened scrutiny analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.A. was adjudicated delinquent for violating Tampa's juvenile curfew ordinance (Tampa, Fla. Code § 14-26(c)). The trial court upheld the ordinance's …
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DAVIS, Judge.
J.A. appeals the trial court’s adjudication of delinquency for violating Tampa’s juvenile curfew ordinance. See Tampa, Fla.Code § 14 — 26(c) (1996). He argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional. This court, previously rejected his argument and affirmed the trial court’s determination that the ordinance was constitutional. See J.A. v. State, 779 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed 788 So. 2d 953 (Fla.2001).’ In affirming the trial, court, this court applied the heightened scrutiny test. See State v. T.M., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA. 2000), quashed, 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla.2001). However, this court also certified two questions to the Florida Supreme Court as being of great public importance:
WHAT LEVEL QF SCRUTINY MUST A COURT APPLY WHEN REVIEWING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCE?
WHETHER THE TAMPA JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court answered the first question by directing that the proper test for determining the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance is strict scrutiny. Accordingly,1 'without answering the second question, the, supreme court remanded this matter back to this court for application of the strict scrutiny test. ' See J.A. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953 (Fla.2001).
For the reasons stated in J.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), we find that the Tampa ordinance is unconstitutional and reverse the adjudication of delinquency. However, we again certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question to be of great public importance:
WHETHER THE TAMPA JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Reversed.
CASANUEVA, J., Concurs.
NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs specially.
NORTHCUTT, Judge,
Specially concurring.
I concur in my colleagues’ majority opinion with one reservation. In J.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), on which today’s ruling is based, I wrote a concurring opinion stressing that in my view it is an open question whether the city’s interest in protecting children’s welfare can ever justify a blanket prohibition against them leaving their homes during specified hours. Thus, as I did in that case, I agree that this ordinance is unconstitutional for at least the reasons described in the J.P. majority opinion.
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- State v. T.M., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- J.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- J.P. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 2001)
- J.A. v. State, 779 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)