WILLIAM J. MOORE, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Ellington v. State, 96 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
  …s not have discretion to depart from the sentence mandated by sec [*1132] tion 775.082(9), and the refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter of law. See State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Appellant’s conviction for felony battery for intentionally touching or striking another against her will causing great bodily harm, permanent injury or permanent disfigurement qualified appellant for sentencing as a prison re…
• State v. Retalic, 902 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
  …his ground after having made repeated attempts to gain the victim’s cooperation. Moreover, even if the victim had asked for leniency, the State correctly points out that it was under no obligation to adhere to the request. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (recognizing that the PRRA clearly gives the state attorney, not the trial court, discretion to seek a punishment less than the PRRA requires when extenuating circumstances exist, including when the victim favors a lesser sentenc…
• State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
  …e, 766 So. 2d 480, 481-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). In such a case, the trial court does not have discretion to depart from the Act’s mandated sentence, and refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter of law. See State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).. Recently, in State v. Davis, 834 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), we vacated a sentence based on the trial judge’s refusal to impose the Act’s enhanced penalties. In Davis, the trial judge believed that the State had waived…

Authorities Cited

• Isley v. State, 652 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
• Davis v. State, 705 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
• Rahymes v. State, 730 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
• Lockett v. State, 769 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)