STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT SMITH, JR., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A trial court has no discretion to refuse sentencing a defendant as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) once the state proves the defendant meets the statutory criteria.
[1] A trial court has no discretion to deviate from mandatory sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act once the state proves the defendant qualifies for such sente…
[2] The discretion to seek a punishment less than that required by the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, based on extenuating circumstances including victim recommendation, res…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert Smith was found guilty of lewd or lascivious battery. The state sought to sentence him as a PRR, proving he met the criteria, including being r…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Extenuating Circumstances cases and more on FLexlaw
PLEUS, J.
The state appeals the sentence imposed on Robert Smith after a jury found him guilty of two counts of lewd or lascivious battery.1 The state argues that the trial court erred when it refused to sentence Smith as a prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) after the state proved that he qualified for such a sentence. We agree and reverse for resentencing.
Smith was charged with two counts of lewd or lascivious battery. Before trial, the state filed a notice of its election to prosecute Smith as a PRR. At trial, the jury found Smith guilty as charged on both counts. At sentencing, the state presented certified copies of Smith’s judgments and sentences and called a fingerprint expert who verified each of the defendant’s prior convictions. In addition, the state presented an affidavit showing that Smith had been released from prison just over two months before he committed the instant crimes. The trial court explicitly found that the state had proven by a preponderance of the evidence “that the defendant meets the criteria for sentencing as a Prison Releasee Reoffender pursuant to the statute.” The state asked the court to sentence Smith to 203.1 months as a PRR. Defense counsel asked the court to impose a five year sentence, arguing that Smith should not be sentenced as a PRR because neither the 12-year-old victim nor her mother favored a sentence greater than five years. The court decided not to sentence Smith as a PRR based on the victim’s and her mother’s wishes. The court sentenced Smith to five years on each count to be served concurrent, stating:
I would also find that he does meet the criteria, but I chose not to sentence him as Prison Releasee Reoffender because of the victim coming forward at the last moment and stating that it was what she wanted as far as the five years.
The state is correct that once it proves that a defendant is qualified under the PRR Act, the trial court has no discretion to sentence the defendant under the act. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000); Johnson v. State, 766 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
Smith argues there is an exception to the mandatory PRR sentence requirement found in section 775.082(d), Florida Statutes, which provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law in as provided in the subsection, unless the state attorney determines that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, including whether the victim recommends that the offender not be sentenced as provided in this subsection.
Smith also relies on Vlahovich v. State, 757 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), in which the court stated:
Once a case reaches us on appeal, the only possible exception that the sentencing court could apply to relieve itself of sentencing under the Act is subsection c., which allows the court not to sentence the offender as a prison releasee reof-fender if the victim does not want the offender to receive a prison releasee reoffender sentence.
Id. at 1221.
These authorities offer no assistance to Smith. Section 775.082(d)l clearly gives the state attorney, not the trial court, discretion to seek a punishment less than the PRR Act requires when extenuating circumstances exist, including whether the victim favors a lesser sentence.
In addition, the state notes that Vlaho-vich, cited by Smith, was later quashed by the Florida Supreme Court in Vlahovich v. State, 788 So. 2d 245 (Fla.2001), “as it relates to the petitioner’s sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.” The supreme court remanded the case “for reconsideration upon application of our decisions in Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000); McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.2000); and Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla.2000).” 788 So. 2d at 245.
Based on the above-cited cases, the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to sentence Smith as a PRR. Once the trial court determined that the state had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant met PRR qualifications, the trial court erred in refusing to sentence him as a PRR. Accordingly, Smith’s sentence is reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing under the PRR act.
REVERSE AND REMAND.
COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . § 800.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ellington v. State, 96 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…s not have discretion to depart from the sentence mandated by sec [*1132] tion 775.082(9), and the refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter of law. See State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Appellant’s conviction for felony battery for intentionally touching or striking another against her will causing great bodily harm, permanent injury or permanent disfigurement qualified appellant for sentencing as a prison re…
-
State v. Retalic, 902 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…his ground after having made repeated attempts to gain the victim’s cooperation. Moreover, even if the victim had asked for leniency, the State correctly points out that it was under no obligation to adhere to the request. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (recognizing that the PRRA clearly gives the state attorney, not the trial court, discretion to seek a punishment less than the PRRA requires when extenuating circumstances exist, including when the victim favors a lesser sentenc…
-
State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…e, 766 So. 2d 480, 481-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). In such a case, the trial court does not have discretion to depart from the Act’s mandated sentence, and refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter of law. See State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).. Recently, in State v. Davis, 834 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), we vacated a sentence based on the trial judge’s refusal to impose the Act’s enhanced penalties. In Davis, the trial judge believed that the State had waived…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000)
- Vlahovich v. State, 757 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Donel Johnson v. State, 766 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Vlahovich v. State, 788 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2001)