M.P., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
M.P., a child with special needs, appeals his adjudication as delinquent and commitment to a Level 6 Moderate-Risk residential program despite the Department of Juvenile Justice's recommendation for community control. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirms, holding that the trial court properly stated reasons supported by evidence for departing from the DJJ's recommendation.
The trial court did not err in departing from the DJJ's recommendation because it stated reasons for the departure that were supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record. A trial court may depart from a DJJ recommendation if it provides reasons supported by evidence, and here the court properly found that M.P.'s pattern of delinquent behavior while on probation, his continued disruptiveness, disrespect, and anger management issues demonstrated that community control was inadequate and a Moderate-Risk level was appropriate.
[1] A trial court may depart from a juvenile justice department's recommendation for disposition if the court states reasons for the departure and those reasons are supported…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting a juvenile justice department's dispositional recommendation when the record contains competent, substantial evid…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”
Establishes the legal standard for when a trial court may deviate from a DJJ recommendation in juvenile disposition proceedings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.P. is a child with hyperactivity, anxiety, and attention deficiency problems who was in special education classes. He was on community control for o…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Juvenile Delinquency Disposition cases and more on FLexlaw
THOMPSON, C.J.
M.P. appeals from an order of disposition which found M.P. delinquent and committed M.P. to a Level 6 Moderate-Risk residential program. We affirm.
The commitment was despite a Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) recommendation that M.P. be returned to community control. M.P. contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it rejected the DJJ’s recommendation by not following the requirements of section 985.23(3)(c) Florida Statutes (2000).1 M.P. asserts that the trial court erred because it overruled DJJ’s recommendation without taking into account the needs of the child visa-vis the characteristics of the restrictiveness level. M.P. is a child with special needs: M.P. suffers from hyperactivity, anxiety, and attention deficiency problems. To accommodate his needs, M.P. was in special classes. M.P. was on community control for one year at the time of this delinquent act. The current act was initially charged as grand theft of a motor vehicle in the second degree, but as the result of plea negotiations, the charge was reduced to trespass to a conveyance. At the disposition hearing, the trial court heard testimony showing that M.P. requires special programs, that M.P. worked diligently during the school year, that he appeared to be well-motivated, and that he appeared to have put forth his best efforts to complete high school. The trial court also heard testimony that M.P. could be defiant and disrespectful in class as well as tardy and truant. On bad days, M.P. was disruptive. After the testimony the trial court stated why it would not accept the DJJ’s recommendations:
[T]he youth has exhibited a continuing and persistent pattern of delinquent and [aberrant] behavior while on probation evidencing that probation is not an adequate restrictiveness level and, that a Moderate Risk restrictiveness level is appropriate. Obviously the youth needs include learning anger control and impulse control, and learning to participate in school work daily with no disciplinary referral, no tardiness, nor disruption, nor defiance, nor disrespect. The performance goals of this youth or any youth in a Moderate Risk commitment program are calculated to address those goals in addition to providing individual counseling and other appropriate intervention methods.
A trial court may not depart from the DJJ’s recommendation because it disagrees with the recommendation. A.G. v. State, 737 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). However, the court may depart as long as it states reasons for the departure and those reasons are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. L.O. v. State, 718 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla.1998). In this case, the court recognized that although M.P. was improving, M.P. was on community control when he committed the new offense. The trial court observed that M.P. was disruptive at school, was disrespectful toward teachers, and still had problems with anger management and impulse control. Further, the restrictiveness level of community control had not helped M.P. with his social adjustment or his school adjustment. The court concluded that M.P. needed the structure of the Moderate-Risk restrictiveness level.
We find that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected the DJJ’s recommendation. See D.E.R. v. State, 744 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); J.L.O. v. State, 721 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); E.L. v. State, 715 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. . Fla. Stats. § 985.23(3)(c) reads:
The court shall commit the child to the department at the restrictiveness level identified or may order placement at different restrictiveness level. The court shall state for the record the reasons which establish by a preponderance of the evidence why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the restrictiveness level recommended by the department.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
C.M.L. v. State, 895 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…d the needs of the child. L.O. v. State, 718 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla.1998); S.S.M. v. State, 814 So. 2d 1234, 1234-1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Our standard of appellate review in such cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion. M.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 877, 878 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). On January 28, 2003, C.M.L. entered a no-contest plea to reduced charges of aggravated battery with great bodily harm and witness tampering.1 At sentencing, the trial judge concluded that the [*497] DJJ’s formal recommenda…
-
G.I.G. v. State, 957 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…that the court failed to state sufficient reasons founded on competent substantial evidence to support a departure from the Department’s recommendation, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. See M.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). There is, however, one issue that needs to be further addressed by the trial court. In J.I.S. v. State, 930 So. 2d 587, 596 (Fla.2006), the Florida Supreme Court held that credit for time served must be given for pre-commitmen…
Authorities Cited
- A.G. v. State, 737 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- L.O. v. State, 718 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1998)
- J.L.O. v. State, 721 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- E.L. v. State, 715 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- D.E.R. v. State, 744 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)