DRAKE LUMBER COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
E. L. SEMPLE, THE W. P. THURSTON COMPANY, AND ANDERSON PROPERTIES, INC., APPELLEES, AND- THE W. P. THURSTON COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT, V. ANDERSON PROPERTIES, INC., DRAKE LUMBER COMPANY, AND E. L. SEMPLE, APPELLEES, AND- ANDERSON PROPERTIES, INC., APPELLANT, V. E. L. SEMPLE, THE W. P. THURSTON COMPANY, INC., AND DRAKE LUMBER COMPANY, APPELLEES. ON PETITION OF THE W. P. THURSTON COMPANY INC., FOR REHEARING
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The Florida Supreme Court denied W. P. Thurston Company's petition for rehearing in a complex multi-party dispute involving mortgage assignments and promissory notes. The Court found that certain factual discrepancies identified in the petition did not materially affect the conclusions of the original July 17, 1930 decision.
The Court held that the identified discrepancies—whether checks were payable to Davis or Anderson, and the exact timing of the mortgage assignment delivery—did not materially affect the ultimate results or conclusions reached in the original decision.
“In either case, the results of the transaction are not affected.”
Establishes that regardless of whether checks were payable to Davis or Anderson, the outcome remained the same
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involved transactions relating to checks, a promissory note, and a mortgage assignment dated February 24, 1927. A note had been indorsed to a…
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The appellant W. P. Thurston Company, Inc., has filed petition in the above cause for rehearing, and in said pe-. tition has pointed out certain discrepancies on pages 6 and 10 of the original opinion filed herein on July 17, 1930.
The discrepancies referred to in the motion for rehearing have reference to statements in the above-mentioned *1772opinion that the two cheeks issued by Whyel were made payable to Davis, who indorsed them to the bank. As a matter of fact the record shows that the checks were made payable to Anderson who indorsed them over to the bank in exchange for the note in question which Davis had indorsed to the bank for collection. In either case, the results of the transaction are not affected.
The other discrepancy pointed out in the motion for rehearing is that the assignment of the' mortgage from Davis to Whyel had been already made when Anderson procured the note from the bank. It appears from a copy of' the note and assignment in the transcript that both checks and the assignment were dated February 24, 1927, which is the day the note was transferred by the bank. Though the assignment may not have been delivered on that date, it would make no material difference in the ultimate results, as the note constituted the evidence of the debt, while the mortgage and assignment were incident or ancillary thereto.
It appearing that the matters, referred to in the motion for rehearing do not in any way affect the conclusion reached in the former judgment in said cause, the motion for rehearing should be, and the same is hereby, denied.
The Court having considered the petition for rehearing herein with the record in the cause, and the foregoing opinion prepared under Chapter 14553, Acts of 1929, adopted by the Court as its opinion, it is considered and ordered by the Court that the said petition for rehearing be and the same is hereby denied.
Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Strum, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
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