JIMMIE REED JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jimmie Reed Jackson was convicted of aggravated assault and resisting arrest following an incident with a police officer. The appellate court reversed the convictions, holding that a detective's assurances that he was conducting only an administrative use-of-force investigation—not a criminal investigation—invalidated Jackson's earlier Miranda warnings and made his subsequent statements inadmissible.
The court held that Holtz's assurances misled Jackson and vitiated the earlier Miranda warnings. Because Jackson's state of mind was the relevant inquiry, and the detective's false representations demonstrably influenced Jackson's decision to speak, the statements should have been suppressed. The convictions were reversed and remanded for a new trial.
[1] Statements made by a defendant after receiving Miranda warnings are inadmissible if the subsequent questioning, even if framed as administrative, effectively vitiates tho…
[2] A defendant's state of mind, and the potential effect of an investigator's words on that state of mind, are determinative when assessing whether Miranda warnings have bee…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Holtz's assurances to Jackson, that he was not investigating the underlying charges, only the use of force, misled Jackson and vitiated the earlier Miranda rights.”
States the core legal principle that false assurances about the nature of an investigation can invalidate Miranda warnings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson allegedly struck Miami-Dade Police Officer Robertson with a hammer during an arrest. Officer Robertson beat Jackson with a baton in self-defen…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Jimmie Reed Jackson appeals judgments of conviction. We reverse and remand for a new trial holding that the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s motion to exclude statements given to Sergeant Holtz.
Jackson was charged with aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, and resisting an officer with violence stemming from the following incident. Miami-Dade Police Department bicycle patrol Officer Robertson alleged that Jackson hit him with a hammer when Jackson came out from a shed where he was hiding. To protect himself, Robertson beat Jackson with an asp — a twenty-one inch retractable baton. Robertson read Jackson his Miranda rights. Because of his injuries, Jackson was not allowed into the station; instead, he was held in the parking lot.
Sargent Holtz approached Jackson in the parking lot to investigate Robertson’s use of force. Holtz did not re-read Jackson his Miranda rights, because he “was not conducting a criminal investigation. [He was] just conducting an administrative report for departmental purposes.” Holtz testified that Jackson was being treated by paramedics for his injuries, and he was hostile, reluctant to speak with Holtz. Holtz had to “urge” Jackson to speak with him. Holtz told Jackson that the questions were not related to the underlying offense, but only to the use-of-force investigation. Jackson responded, “That’s a relief. I’m on probation.” Jackson proceeded to tell Holtz that he was trying to smoke marijuana. Jackson told Holtz he had tossed the marijuana on the roof when he ran from the police. At that point Holtz paused and radioed for the officers who were still at the scene to search the location. Thereafter, Jackson stated to Holtz that he came out of the shed with the hammer because he feared use of police dogs. Jackson filed a motion to suppress these statements. The court denied the motion, and Holtz’s statements were admitted at trial.
The sole issue at trial was whether Jackson committed the aggravated battery, aggravated assault and resisting arrest by striking Robertson with a hammer. Robertson testified that Jackson had a hammer and struck him in the arm. Jackson testified that he fled from the police and hid in a shed to avoid detection. He came out of hiding with his hands up and never had a hammer. A witness saw the officer making striking motions; she did not hear Robertson telling Jackson to throw down a hammer, or anything else — she only heard Jackson’s cries. The jury asked for a magnifying glass to examine the pictures of Robertson’s injury from the hammer. The jury ultimately acquitted Jackson of aggravated battery, finding him guilty of attempted aggravated battery (a lesser included offense), aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence. Jackson appeals.
We reverse the convictions because the defendant’s motion should have been granted. Holtz’s assurances to Jackson, that he was not investigating the underlying charges, only the use of force, misled Jackson and vitiated the earlier Miranda rights. Cribbs v. State, 378 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The inquiry in this case “turns on the [defendant’s] state of mind, not the investigator’s, and the potential effect on [defendant] of the words used....” D.N. v. State, 529 So. 2d 1217, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), disapproved on other grounds by State v. G.C., 572 So .2d 1380 (Fla.1991). See Walker v. State, 771 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); In Re: K.H., 418 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The change in Jackson’s demeanor, and immediate co-operation demonstrate he was persuaded by Holtz’s assurances that the underlying crime didn’t interest him. Holtz’s statements were obviously untrue, as Holtz immediately reported the location of the discarded contraband, and the state thereafter introduced Holtz’s testimony at trial. It is clear from the circumstances, that Jackson was deluded as to his true position, and that the representations influenced his decision to speak with Holtz. Holtz’s actions vitiated the Miranda warnings; the subsequent statements should have been excluded.
Reversed and remanded.
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Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. 2014)…ge’s response to jury’s request for a magnifying glass without informing either the State or the defendant of request was outside the express notice requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.410, but was harmless error); Jackson v. State, 832 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (stating, although not at issue, the fact that the jury asked for and was provided a magnifying glass, with no objection, to examine pictures of victim’s injury). Neither decision addresses whether it is proper for a jury to…
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Murdock v. State, 115 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…ndoned and the consequences of the abandonment.” Louis, 855 So. 2d at 255. “The inquiry in this case turns on the [defendant’s] state of mind, not the investigator’s, and the potential effect on [defendant] of the words used....’ ” Jackson v. State, 832 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting D.N. v. State, 529 So. 2d 1217, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1991) (alterations in original)). Therefore, we reverse to suppress the second intervi…
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State v. Baird, 175 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…spension.”). As in the above-cited cases, the circuit court here improperly conducted an independent review of the video tape and reweighed the evidence provided by that video tape. This was error. The circuit court also cited to Jackson v. State, 832 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)1 for the proposition that “the inquiry in this case turns on the defendant’s state of mind, not the investigator’s, and the potential effect on defendant of the words used.” However, that case is not applicable because evidence wa…
Authorities Cited
- State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991)
- In the Interest of D.N. v. State, 529 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Booker v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 771 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Walker v. State, 771 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Cribbs v. State, 378 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- In the Interest of K. H., 418 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)