JOSEPH WISE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2003-01-10
No. 2D01-4193
CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.
833 So. 2d 882 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Joseph Wise was convicted of lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child, but the Florida appellate court reversed because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on a statute subsection under which Wise was not charged, rendering the guilty verdict a nullity.


Holding

It was reversible error to instruct the jury on a crime not charged. Because Wise was not charged under § 800.04(3) and the jury's general verdict did not specify the theory by which it found him guilty, the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.


Headnotes

[1] A jury instruction on a crime not charged in the information constitutes reversible error.

[2] A general jury verdict is a nullity when the jury is instructed on a crime not charged.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Although the charging document cited section 800.04(2), and arguably included the language of subsection (4), by including the instruction on penetration or union with the mouth, the trial court instructed the jury on subsection (3). Because Wise was not charged under subsection (3), and because the jury's verdict was a general verdict that did not specify the theory by which it found Wise guilty, it was reversible error to include the instruction.”

Establishes the core error—instructing on an uncharged subsection with a general verdict creates reversible error.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Wise was charged under Florida Statute § 800.04(2) with committing a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under 16 by exposing his penis…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DAVIS, Judge.

DAVIS, Judge.

Joseph Wise challenges his conviction and sentence for lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen. Although Wise raises several issues, because we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, we reverse without addressing Wise’s other arguments.

The information charging Wise stated that he:

knowingly did commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of [A.P.], a child under the age of sixteen years, by willfully and knowingly exposing the penis of Joseph Wise to the view of the said [A.P.], and by soliciting and procuring the said [A.P.] to touch, feel or hold the exposed penis of Joseph Wise, which act as stated was lewd and lascivious in the presence of the said child ... but without committing the crime of sexual battery ....

The information then stated that Wise’s actions jvere contrary to section 800.04(2), Florida Statutes (1997).

Section 800.04 provides:

A person who:
(1) Handles, fondles, or assaults any child under the age of 16 years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;

(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual lewd exhibition of the genitals, or any act or conduct which simulates that sexual battery is being or will be committed upon any child under the age of 16 years or forces or entices the child to commit any such act;

(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011(l)(h) upon any child under the age of 16 years; or (4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child under the age of 16 years,

Without committing the crime of sexual battery, commits a felony of the second degree ....

At trial, the trial court instructed the jury:

Before you can find the defendant guilty ... the State must prove the following ... Joseph Wise committed upon [A.P.], or forced or enticed [A.P.] to commit masturbation, or Joseph Wise committed an act, or forced or enticed [A.P.] to commit an act in which the penis of Joseph Wise penetrated or had union with the mouth of [A.P.], or Joseph Wise knowingly committed a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of [A.P.],

Although the charging document cited section 800.04(2), and arguably included the language of subsection (4), by including the instruction on penetration or union with the mouth, the trial court instructed the jury on subsection (3).1 Because Wise was not charged under subsection (3), and because the jury’s verdict was a general verdict that did not specify the theory by which it found Wise guilty, it was reversible error to include the instruction. See O’Bryan v. State, 692 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

In O’Bryan, the defendant was alternately charged under subsections (1) and (4) of section 800.04, but the trial court instructed the jury on subsections (1) and (2). The First District held that it was fundamental error to instruct the jury on a crime not charged and that the resulting verdict was a nullity. Based on O’Bryan, the verdict here is a nullity, and we therefore reverse Wise’s conviction.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ„ Concur. . Section 794.01 l(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1997), defines sexual battery as "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration Jby, or union with, the sexual organ of another .... ”


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Jefferies v. State, 849 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …hich is not an intentional crime at all. Because this court has recognized that in these instances it is fundamental error to in [*405] struct the jury on a crime not charged in the information, the resulting verdict is a nullity. See Wise v. State, 833 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing O’Bryan v. State, 692 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Because our disposition is not based on the sufficiency of the evidence but on an error in the proceedings, we reverse and remand for a new trial. See Burks v. Un…
  • Quartez M. Davis v. State, 210 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
    …l error to revoke probation on uncharged allegations); Freccacreto v. State, 291 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding that trial court committed fundamental error by convicting defendant of crime that State had nolle-prossed); Wise v. State, 833 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that it was fundamental error to convict defendant for crime not charged and that verdict was a nullity). We do not know whether the trial would have revoked community control based solely on a technical violation of…
  • Horne v. State, 846 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …ort a conviction under subsection (b) (engaging in), we conclude that the court erred in denying judgment of acquittal as to counts I and II. As a result, Horne was improperly convicted of an offense with which he was not charged, see Wise v. State, 833 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gaines v. State, 652 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Moore v. State, 496 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), and the verdict as to counts I and II is a nullity. In light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach Horne’…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw