IN THE INTEREST OF N.C., A CHILD. S.C., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE; R.C., APPELLANT, V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE
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Parents appealed a dependency adjudication and placement order signed by a successor judge who did not preside over the hearings. The court reversed and remanded because Florida law requires the judge who presided over the proceedings to sign the final order.
No. A successor judge who did not hear the testimony and argument at the hearings lacks authority to sign the final order of adjudication and disposition. The trial judge who presided over the proceedings must sign the order.
[1] A successor judge may not sign an order of dependency adjudication and disposition when that judge did not preside over the hearings and hear the testimony and argument p…
[2] A trial court order signed by a successor judge who did not preside over the proceedings is subject to reversal.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Department concedes that it was error for a successor judge to sign the order, because he did not hear the testimony and argument presented at the hearings.”
Establishes that the critical error was a judge signing an order without presiding over the proceedings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.C. and R.C. were parents of child N.C., who was adjudicated dependent and placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services. O…
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PER CURIAM.
This is a consolidated appeal by S.C. and R.C. from the trial court’s order adjudicating their child, N.C., dependent and placing her in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department). We find merit in only one of three issues raised in this appeal. The Department concedes that it was error for a successor judge to sign the order of dependency adjudication and disposition. This error requires reversal and remand for further proceedings.
The record reveals that one judge presided over the dependency proceedings, but another judge signed the final order of adjudication and disposition. The Department concedes it was error for the successor judge to sign the order, because he did not hear the testimony and argument presented at the hearings. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to reverse. See Umscheid v. Umscheid, 724 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Carr v. Byers, 578 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Beattie v. Beattie, 586 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Broward County v. Mitten, 421 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Silvern v. Silvern, 252 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
The record does not reveal why a successor judge signed the dependency order being challenged in this appeal, although we suspect it was because the predecessor judge rotated to another division in the circuit court. If so, it is unfortunate that the parties have expended the time and money to appeal this case without first seeking to obtain an order signed by the trial judge, who retains jurisdiction to enter such orders notwithstanding rotation to another circuit court division. Upon remand, if the same findings are set forth in a properly rendered order, we observe that the record before us supports those findings.
Reversed and remanded with directions that, if possible, the trial judge who presided over the dependency hearings should enter such order as she considers appropriate. If the trial judge is not available to render an order, this cause is remanded for de novo hearings unless the parties stipulate that the successor judge may render a new order after review of the record of the prior proceedings. See Tompkins Land & Hous., Inc. v. White, 431 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
FULMER, WHATLEY, and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.
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In the Interest of L.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. & Guardian Ad Litem Program, 932 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…438, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that in the absence of a stipulation by the parties, a successor judge may not enter a judgment when factual matters were tried before a predecessor judge); S.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re N.C.), 834 So. 2d 189, 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (concluding that it was reversible error for a successor judge to sign a final order of adjudication of dependency because another judge presided over the proceedings and the successor judge did not hear the testimony and arg…
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Rhynes-Partlow v. Juantia Rhynes (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2016)…inst them. This Court has jurisdiction under Florida Statute section 26.012(1) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A). Because the final judgment was signed by a judge that did not preside over the trial, we reverse.1 See In re N.C., 834 So. 2d 189, 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (court “compelled to reverse” when a different judge signed the final order than the one that presided over the dependency proceedings); Hartney v. Piedmont Tech., Inc., 814 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing be…
Authorities Cited
- Silvern v. Silvern, 252 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Tompkins Land & Hous., Inc. v. Terryceia Vann White, 431 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Carr v. Byers, 578 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Umscheid v. Umscheid, 724 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Broward Cnty. v. John and Catherine Mitten, 421 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)